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Summary
This is a personal account of a design practice considered from a first-
person perspective.  I review several decades of design activity in order to 
better understand my own philosophical trajectory. I form an understand-
ing of my own design practice in virtue of the conceptual frameworks 
forged in the design activities investigated. The process is therefore entire-
ly recursive, and is a design activity in itself.  Its principle value has been 
to give me a much deeper understanding of the dynamics of a design 
practice focusing on the designer and his ways of thinking rather than on 
the work. I come to understand that a designer’s frameworks determine 
much of what can be understood, that frameworks are implicated in the 
problem itself. I propose that designers first uncover the tacit frameworks 
that guide their practices through an examination of the failures, surpris-
es or unexpected results that occur in work guided by them. Designers 
might learn to set aside their frameworks when they no longer serve. I call 
this process ‘Anamnesis and Amnesia’: first remember and then forget. I 
believe that this view has had great value to my practice of teaching de-
sign. I offer it to others in the hope that they may find similar value in this 
strategy, or to be inspired to undertake a journey of their own.
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terest was maintained throughout the remaining days of the conference 
across a wide range of fields. I was impressed with this community and its 
conversations. Now, I find that much of my own understanding has been 
adapted from this approach to understanding design and practice.
What follows can be considered a case study in the reflective consider-
ation of a design practice and the ways in which such reflections feed 
back into the work. This continuous and iterative looping is, of course, 
a characteristic of design, so that, this reflective study is design applied 
to the practice of design. I find that this has been a tacit element in my 
practice, but now, having recognized, and thereby, to having experienced 
it in a new way, I can also recognize it in others and can facilitate their 
experience. This is one way to teach. In virtue of having undertaken this 
reflection on my own work, I have come to some realizations that I could 
not have made otherwise, that are, I believe, of applicability beyond my 
own practice. Their effects are felt across both my research and teaching 
and, I expect, will be understood as an major point of inflection in my 
work in the years the follow.
In the writing that follows, I first set forth the perspective from which I 
will view the work, one that is interested in and informed by the study of 
perception. In the second chapter, I review the principal shifts that have 
occurred in the things that I design, broadly a change from objects to ex-
periences. In the third, the reasons why I design can be seen to shift from 
the pragmatic to the epistemic. It highlights role that surprise, encounter-
ing the unexpected, has within my work. Then, having looked at changes, 
I consider elements of my practice that have remained more constant; 
an interest in sensing and responsiveness and the incorporation of found 
objects into the work. These are further understood to be elements of a 
general openness to influence that is a characteristic that has remained 
and that also is consistent with seeing the practice in a dynamic way. The 
fifth chapter sets out my thoughts about design following this reflective 
process, with the final chapter seeing that this too, is part of a longer-term 
pattern in my practice.
During the course of this reflection, I will refer to a range of activities 
that comprise my practice. These are compiled into a set of appendices. 
Some familiarity with this body of work will be of value in following my 
thoughts about it and the reader may benefit from a review of this material 
before proceeding further.
Introduction
In this writing I set out a reflection on the course of my practice. The 
principal reason for undertaking such a task is for me to understand 
my own design practice at a deeper level. My motivation has changed 
over the course of its undertaking. Initially I thought that perhaps there 
was a uniqueness to find, something special about the way that I design 
that might be of interest to a wider community. But these thoughts have 
largely dissipated. For a time, the concern was to understand that what 
could be called a practice was actually something that shifted significant-
ly over time. I have documented some of that here, but where I believe 
the eventual value resides is in reflecting upon these changes and seeing 
instead deeper levels of continuity. This understanding of a practice, and 
the subsequent practicing of that understanding, not as a concatenation 
of techniques, predispositions, or characteristic ways of proceeding but 
as something that is deeply individual in its origins is new, at least for me.
This is what I will come to call later in this writing the epistemic dimen-
sion of the work; the way in which the work changes the way I think about 
design. As one whose practice is involved in teaching, the pragmatic di-
mension of the work has to do with the way in which its undertaking has 
opened my understanding of and generosity to the developing design 
capabilities of my students. This shift in the way that I approach teaching 
is the largest and perhaps most significant shift over the course of this un-
dertaking. There is a radical difference in the tone, content and target of 
the commentary. I now approach all the specific design decisions made 
by a student as sacrificial to larger questions about the assumptions that 
are brought to the work, the kinds of problems that encountered in work-
ing through the problem, the new realizations about the way design can 
be undertaken derived from these experiences and the student’s propos-
als to shift their approach to design based on what they experienced. 
I believe that addressing these issues will encourage students to begin 
what is essentially a design cycle applied to their designing—designing 
the designer.
I’m still surprised at the animosity that the approach I take engenders in 
some circles. There is an explicit mythologizing of the nature of educa-
tion as ‘serious research into the fundamental questions of our discipline’ 
that is, apparently, able to be done by largely nescient undergraduates. 
Half a dozen of such experiences constitute a professional education. My 
problem with this approach is not necessarily, or only, about the nature of 
the problems posed but the arrogance with which they are discussed and 
the opportunities missed in the conversation and mentoring that seasoned 
designers could offer to those beginning in our extraordinary craft. Still, I 
recognize that not all have had the same experiences that I have and so 
do not require conformance with my approach.
When Ranulph Glanville first inquired about my potential interest in un-
dertaking the PhD it was with the explicit provision that I had to be will-
ing to change the way that I understood things. It turns out that I was 
open to change and interested. I will find out that that is not a chance 
decision, but rather one that is characteristic, a characteristic of which 
I am unaware throughout much of this process, but which I eventually 
discover through it. The second formative experience in this journey was 
participating as a reviewer of work at a Graduate Research Conference in 
2001. The first presentation I participated in involved a small elderly man 
carrying a very heavy satchel, filled, I was soon to find out, with some 
of the most spectacular bits of machining I’d seen. Then Barry Hudson 
presented an internal combustion engine designed using only circular 
motion; an engine that didn’t quite run, yet. But the discussion was about 
design and the aesthetics of machine motion rather than the form, and 
the performance of the engine. This approach intrigued me and my in-
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Models of perception have been developed that are not grounded in 
models of information flow but instead describe how changes in the in-
ternal sensory flux of an organism could give rise to experiences that I 
have of myself within an environment. This approach, known variously 
as the ‘enactive’8 or ‘skill-based’9 theory of perception, is built on the 
notion that to perceive the world one must act upon it. ““All doing is 
knowing and all knowing is doing.”10 Co-relations between the changes 
that occur across the sensory flux due to motor activity, from relationships 
between afferent and efferent nerve activity, form the basis of perception. 
The sensori-motor coupling of an organism and environment produces 
regularities within the continuous flux of nervous activity and form the 
basis for the creation of patterns. Perhaps the most fundamental are the 
regularities that come to be understood and labeled as ‘me’ and those 
that become understood and labeled as the ‘world’ that I inhabit. Here 
both are considered the product of creative activity; both are the products 
of design. Two critical parameters have been added by this description; 
perception is the result of volition and of creativity.
Geophone Philosophy
I live in a 175-year-old wood framed house, a very old house by American 
standards, and the years have not been kind to it. Further, due to a wrinkle 
in the local regulatory structure, it is trivial to demolish but more difficult 
to build. The result has been that my house has been more demolished 
than rebuilt and so, appears to be in a ‘perpetual state of becoming’—ar-
chitecture as ontological illustration. In this state, plaster stripped off the 
wooden laths on many walls and with assorted interior partitions removed 
entirely, the house has become noticeably more responsive to vibration. 
Noticeable when, for example, two glasses separated by a hair’s breadth 
briefly tap together to an otherwise imperceptible rhythm. 
Intrigued by these episodic, but happenstance occurrences, I outfitted my 
bedroom wall with a geophone11 to capture the vibrations and to repre-
sent their frequency and intensity on a row of lights. With the detector 
fastened securely to the wooden framing, vehicles passing on the street, 
the clothes washer spinning, and squirrels running on the roof were all 
detected by the geophone and legible on the display. At four o’clock in 
the morning, activity in my city is minimal, so I was surprised to see 
a subtle but still distinct pulse at just over one cycle per second. What 
could this be? 
Not long after noticing this particular vibration and in the course of re-
pairing the wall, I removed the geophone, sheathed the wall with wooden 
panel, and reinstalled the sensor.  As intended, this stiffened the partition 
considerably, but the cyclic effect that had attracted my attention was no 
longer available. 
If I want to determine what caused the light flashes, I might begin with 
where the cause is located. It could originate outside the house in an in-
dustrial activity. While most manufacturing activity has left the Northeast 
US, I live a mile from the Watervliet Arsenal where large armaments man-
ufactured for the United States Army. In addition, there is a rock crushing 
operation several miles to the north. I assume that either of these could 
produce a suitable oscillation. On the other hand, the disturbance could 
be of a geological origin as the city is located on a vast and very old fault 
line that runs from the Gulf of St. Laurence down into New Jersey. But 
the regularity of the diode’s flashing makes this seem unlikely. If the cause 
8	 	Varela,	Thompson,	and	Rosch	(1991)	p.	147-184
9	 	O’Regan,	K	and	Noe,	A.	(2001)
10		Maturana,	H.	and	Varela,	F.	(1992)	p.27
11		A	geophone	 is	a	 sensor	 that	measures	movements	and	vibration	commonly	
used	for	detecting	seismic	activity,	but	also	employed	in	security	systems.	
Chapter One
A Wicked Discipline
“Who can draw a line? Who can draw any line? Isn’t everything interwoven with everything?” 
Butler1
“Draw a distinction!” Spencer-Brown2
Randall Beer, a cognitive and computer scientist, notes how the philo-
sophical framing of a problem circumscribes what can be understood 
about it. This is because the framework determines what kinds of questions 
are asked and the methods that will be employed in answering them; it 
determines the constitution of relevant evidence, the analytic techniques 
that can be used to interrogate it; and therefore the conclusions that will 
be drawn.3 Here, I will set forth a personal4 epistemology within which I 
will consider my work. This philosophical position is occupied in virtue 
of having undertaken the work that will be explained in reference to it. Its 
purpose is to develop the general framework from which I will revisit a 
range of design work. As Beer suggests, it will in a large measure circum-
scribe my observations about the work and the conclusions that will be 
drawn. Now, I will set forth the position, and later, how I came to adopt it.
This second chapter concerns pattern creation as a fundamental cognitive 
activity that can be recognized as operating across domains ranging from 
acts of perception to disciplinary activities, conceptual frameworks and 
philosophical positions. It is the activity that unites the apparently op-
positional quotations above; the first of which might describe the flow of 
experience and the second how I manage to live within it. I recognize the 
gap between the two statements and its implications for the conclusive-
ness of the claims I can make.
In Autopoiesis, Maturana and Varela posit that the operation of living sys-
tems, from the perspective of the organism, is informationally closed.5 
Conditions inside the boundary that divides the organism from its me-
dium are separated from the exterior so that the processes of living, which 
are necessarily distinct from the surround, can be maintained. While in-
ternal conditions may be influenced by and co-vary with those of the me-
dium, the inherent separation must remain. Because information tends to 
increase variety whereas control seeks to reduce it,6 the internal process 
of regulation of a living thing requires a reduction in variety relative to the 
external conditions. Due to informational closure, an organism can only 
be aware of its internal conditions that are, of necessity, of less variety 
than external conditions. If one accepts these descriptions and retains a 
perspective internal to the organism, theories of perception are limited in 
both the descriptions that should be made of the process of perception 
and the conclusions that can be drawn about the knowledge that an or-
ganism can have about the world in which it exists. Specifically, theories 
of perception that are grounded in information flow from the world to 
the organism will be inconsistent with this view and understandings that 
posit the ability to know an objective and verifiable external reality can-
not be supported. As Ranulph Glanville observes, “What we have is our 
experience.”7
1	 	Butler	(1872)	p.	199
2	 	Spencer-Brown	(1969)	p.	3
3	 	Beer	(2000)
4	 	Here	I	use	personal	to	describe	possession	not	uniqueness.	Originality	or	au-
thorship	are	not	implied	claims.
5	 	Marurana	and	Varela	(1980)	p.38
6	 	Heylighen	and	Joslyn	(1993,	rev	2001)
7	 	Glanville	(1999)
6 Designing Epistemology 7Ted Krueger
the lights may have little initial meaning. But, most people will soon un-
derstand the correlation between their own movements and the output of 
the device. From this initial realization further patterns may be produced 
if the observer is interested. In the writing that follows, what I mean by 
pattern is the structure, organization and interrelationship between ele-
ments of experience or knowledge. The position I hold is that beginning 
with acts of perception, grounded in embodiment, all that is known by 
an individual is ‘bootstrapped’ onto these fundamental perceptual acts, 
by processes that are fundamentally like perceptual acts—the invention 
of patterns from the correlations and regularities in experience. Patterns 
form the material from which additinal patterns are made. 
Perception is, while creative, not unbounded. The sensory flux is what 
it can be in virtue of the conditions of embodiment. In the geophone 
example, when the structure of the wall was altered, the phenomena dis-
appeared. While considerable variation across individuals can be found, 
Hughes estimates that human perception is sensitive to the minus thirty-
fifth power of the available spectra.13 So, in this relation, we have be-
tween us great commonality rather than diversity. 
In a consideration of how humans might communicate with artificial enti-
ties, Torrance and Stein, researchers in artificial intelligence and robotics, 
propose that it is the regularities in the structure of the environment that 
provides a shared grounding for the respective internal representations of 
two agents which may be very different from each other.14 In the context 
of this chapter an objectivist epistemology would be inconsistent and I 
suggest instead that the shared grounding consists in the similar condi-
tions of embodiment. It is the structure of the biological substrate that 
forms the basis of and sets the limits of the perceivable and the knowable. 
From this basis, I experience the medium in which I live in much the same 
way as do others with similar capabilities and experience, members of the 
same culture and environment. So, the act of perception is not one that 
is wholly individual; social verification, the conditions of embodiment 
and properties of the media in which we are immersed all play a role in 
the patterns that are formed. Perception is an act of design, but we are 
educated in design by our culture and we work with particular media. 
I have come to understand perception as a creative activity patterning the 
continuous flux of experience. This position is counter to understanding 
perception as the detection or reception of information in the environ-
ment. A significant shift has taken place in the transition from one model 
to the next. It is set forth here because I have undergone this same change 
in understanding through the course of my work and this has, in turn, 
transformed the way I understand design, the structuring of disciplinary 
activity, and eventually, shaped the understanding that I have of my own 
process as a designer. 
This concept of pattern will be used to describe the frameworks within 
which each of the phases of work was undertaken. Transitions between 
phases of work will be interpreted in terms of these patterns. In some cas-
es the adoption of new frameworks causes shifts in the nature of the work, 
in others the work drives changes in the frameworks. But this pattern 
structure will also be imposed over the whole set works. Design activity 
will be seen to be both the activity by which a pattern comes into being, 
it is also the mechanism through which it is tested, extended, modified 
or replaced.
Anomalies
13		Hughes,	H.	(1999)	p.	7
14		Torrance	and	Stein	(1997)
is external to the house, at what distance is it? Perhaps I should consider 
sources that are much further afield. But perhaps, it’s just the neighbor 
trying to tunnel into my basement.
The cause of the light flashes might also be internal to the house. The 
elongation of a heating pipe as it passes through a partition could result 
in a cycle of stresses and slips, although this should be accompanied by 
audible sound, as would reciprocating machinery. It might have been the 
variations in the pressure of the wind making the house sway. The cause 
might be a fault in the electronics and so may be an artifact internal to 
the device.
Patterns of Patterns
Its possible to continue this kind of conjecture. One’s education, person-
ality, experience and culture shape both the invention of potential causes 
and the degree to which each satisfies the question. Because this is the 
case, the understandings that result from observations of the geophone’s 
lights are dependent upon and reflect upon the observer. Where attribu-
tions of causes can be made, they are undertaken in the context of other 
patterns that are held. Unlike many of the other flashes produced by the 
display, the slow pulses I noticed at night were not accompanied by paral-
lel and coincident events and so they are difficult to understand, which 
is to say, to situate them within the context of other patterns that I have 
made. In contrast, I turn on the clothes washer and note the relationship 
between the changes in its cycles and the changes in the display. I rec-
ognize the sound of traffic on the street and see the corresponding effect. 
While I have never seen a squirrel running across the metal roof of my 
house and would not be able to see one from the bedroom below, in any 
case, and so I do not have a direct and simultaneous correlation between 
the animal’s activity and that of the sensor, I have seen them on the yard 
and in the trees adjacent to the house. The sounds that accompany the 
flashing lights of the display are those that would be made by something 
of that mass and material striking the roof in a sequence and rhythm that 
I have seen in the behaviors of this animal. Here, three pattern sets are 
correlated to form an interpretation; the lights, the sounds and memories 
of movements. These patterns easily interlock to form a cohesive whole. 
It just makes sense. This is what sensing is made of.
Geophones, as all sensors, are responsive to certain kinds of phenomena 
within specific ranges based on their material composition and condi-
tions of deployment. I purchased this sensor on the surplus electronics 
market and it came without technical specifications. I do not know its 
frequency sensitivity or its intended orientation to the phenomena that it 
was designed to detect. In the present example, none of this matters any 
more that the lack of a deep understanding of neurophysiologic processes 
was required before humans began inferring an external reality from the 
output of their own biological sensors.
In this example, the house might be metaphorically considered to be a 
body12 that has active elements from which I try to infer what happens 
both inside and outside of it. Patterns that are easily made involve the 
direct correlation between what I do and the effects that are produced in 
the output of the sensor. Other patterns are judged for consistency with 
what else is known. In the absence of other patterns, it becomes impos-
sible to construct an understanding.
The viability of a hypothetical is tested for consistency with the other 
patterns. To some, who have no knowledge of geophones, the activity of 
12		Yes,	that	old	chestnut	again!	The	danger	is	that	a	first	person	presence	within	
the	description	might	for	some	readers	recall	the	homunculus,	but	the	example	is	
a	metaphor	not	a	model	of	perception.
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tivity, Rittel and Weber describe a class of problems as ‘wicked.’17 These 
are problems those that are embedded within a context and are by their 
nature ill-defined. What is given as the nominal problem might only be 
the most visible symptom of a series of nested related and interdepen-
dent issues. The in-ability to hold variables constant makes it difficult to 
use traditional analytical techniques and to ascribe causality. Perhaps 
more properly, the notion of causality is, within these kinds of problems, 
inherently flawed. There will be multiple interacting variables and even 
if these could be identified using advanced statistical or data-mining 
techniques, their relationship is mutually causal and in a process of con-
stant transformation. Interventions will reconfigure, interact with, and 
transform the problem space. Here, I’m using the term ‘problem space’ 
as a parallel to ‘solution space’, a term often used in technical disci-
plines. The difficulty for ‘wicked problems’ is coming to a formulation 
of the problem. When the formulation is clarified the solution becomes 
specified. So for wicked problems, problem space and solution space 
have a relation. They are different perspective from which to consider 
the situation.18 
An Eisegesis
Developing an understanding of one’s own design practice is a prob-
lem that is embedded and transforming; it is a wicked problem. In this 
respect, the task is not simply analytic and descriptive. Instead the tradi-
tion of including and acknowledging the ‘observer’ within the observa-
tion, the perspective of second-order cybernetics is required here. Con-
structing a pattern out of the experiences of design activity is inherently 
synthetic—another act of design. In attempting to understand the nature 
of a design practice, therefore it is only by means of the realizations 
that come from within the work that the work can be properly under-
stood and evaluated. This looping is required in order to account for the 
perspective from which an accounting of the work is made. So, I have 
found my own design practice a wicked discipline. Understanding that, 
I consider this account an eisegesis rather than an exegesis.
Eisegesis ‘to lead into’ is used here rather than exegesis ‘to lead out 
of’. I intend this as recognition of the personal, idiosyncratic, and non-
canonical account that is the inevitable result of the retrospective inter-
pretation of one’s own work. There is an undeniable circularity in which 
one’s work sets the context for and provides the concepts by which the 
work can be understood. In this sense the interpretation of the work 
comes from the work itself and so the term exegesis might be appropri-
ate. However, exegesis retains a strong implication of canonical author-
ity, of objectivity, rather than personal meaning or interpretation. The 
objective position cannot be supported within a study that is, in the end, 
about continuous transition as seen from the first-person perspective be-
cause an interpretation can only take place from the current conceptual 
frameworks and is therefore a fundamentally ephemeral reading. The 
work is set forth as this temporally dependent personal interpretation. To 
claim this text definitive would be to undermine its identity as a dynamic 
process, which is to me its principle value.
17		Rittel	Webber	(1973)
18	 	Interventions	that	are	thought	of	as	solutions	to	problems	will	often	re-
sult	in	a	transformation	of	the	problem.	It	may	be	better	for	designers	to	consider	
how	their	interventions	shift	the	nature	of	the	problem	than	for	them	to	suffer	
under	 the	 illusion	 that	one	can	offer	a	 solution.	The	notion	of	 solution	carries	
with	it	the	suggestion	that	the	situation	has	been	‘fixed’—that	there	is	an	ideal	
state	that	can	be	attained.	With	wicked	problems	we	are	probably	better	off	try-
ing	to	move	the	difficulty	within	the	problem	space	where	we	are	more	comfort-
able	ethically,	where	we	have	significant	resources,	or	techniques	for	managing,	
and	so	on.
In his investigation of phantom limbs, Ramachandran15 meets a woman 
who was born without arms and yet experiences phantom limbs. She is 
precise in her description noting not only that she has phantoms of arms 
that were never present, but that they are several inches too short. When 
I discuss this reading with my students few have any problem accepting 
it at face value, but I experience it differently. It is an affront to my under-
standing of perception. It makes no sense whatsoever, neither the pres-
ence of the phantoms nor their length. Yet I am unwilling to deny that the 
description this woman gives of her experience is an accurate account. 
There is no reason to believe otherwise. Within the context of the work 
that follows, this woman’s story remains unexplained and incompatible 
with the perspective from which I currently work. It is positioned here as 
a token for the inevitable inconclusiveness that explanations have relative 
to experiences. 
I use this example in my teaching to prompt discussions about experience 
and explanation and in addition to bring forward the role of conflict in de-
sign thinking. Thus, the anomaly simultaneously points to the inadequacy 
of our understanding even while it enables further attempts. One could 
consider that the misfits are discomforts that motivate a new pattern in 
order to incorporate them. This satisfies an aesthetic predisposition16 for 
an elegant simplicity. Occam’s happy. But, here the motivation differs in 
that I am not pushed into a new pattern to resolve problems encountered 
with the old, but attracted to them; actively collecting and maintaining 
anomalies in order to assemble the material from which to design the new 
pattern. The act of design is what motivates the collection of anomalies. 
The reward is not the resulting order but the act of design itself. 
This account of the activity of a designer is a case study in which the types 
and objectives of the design activity can be seen to shift over time. Four 
main transitions are identified. 
Initially I was heavily invested in the objects produced as objects that 
communicate meaning. This objective shifts over time until currently, 
the objective is primarily epistemic, that is the goal of the design work 
is to understand something in a new way. This shift is accompanied 
by changes in the disciplines that are most influential in the context 
of the work. 
The material with which I work has transitioned from machines to the 
biological. This happened across a series of stages in which the work 
was entirely material, to material with biological behaviors, to biol-
ogy augmented by technology. Consistent with this change is the shift 
in interest from the formal properties of the objects to their behavior, 
to the experience of the user, and finally, to the understanding of the 
designer. 
Over the same period I have made a shift in my philosophical per-
spective from positivism to constructivism. 
I was initially a designer/maker and in professional practice and have 
made the transition to teaching and academic program building. 
None of these transitions are singularly causal of any of the others, but all 
are interrelated and interacting. The transitions will be explained as meta-
level design activities that seek out and accommodate new information 
and bodies of knowledge.
In what has become for me a central paper in the definition of design ac-
15		Ramachandran	and	Blakeslee	(1999)	
16		Kuhn	(1975)	p.	155
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Chapter Two
A Work in Process
“Whenever theory has built on the dynamic unity and coherency of structures…consider instead 
what would follow if those units were to be explained as the contingent outcomes of ‘intersecting 
processes” Taylor
Peter Taylor is a social scientist making connections between concepts 
in Developmental Systems Theory and those in Social Science. He is 
suggesting that what are normally considered to be enduring objects or 
things—in the social sciences, entities like organizations, states, econo-
mies, corporations and the like—might instead be understood as being 
continuously recreated by dynamic processes.1 This way of looking has 
profound consequences for an understanding of social processes. 
One can see the way in which a process results in an apparent object in, 
for example, a standing wave. I recall watching a standing wave in the 
waters of a brook that emptied into the Pacific across a swath of sand laid 
bare by a falling tide. A particularly prominent wave moved from the top 
of the beach down and across it following the streambed into the sea. 
But here, it is inappropriate to speak of causes. The sand, water and slope 
were in a configuration that resulted in a wave that could be tracked at the 
pace of a slow walk for many meters. The apparent object was supported 
by underlying dynamics and continued its existence as long as those pro-
cesses were sustained.
I consider this dynamic perspective a generalization of the notion of au-
topoesis in biology. Matter comes into an identifiable configuration as 
it gets caught up in a certain dynamic and then dissipates again when 
the dynamic stops. Developmental Systems Theory is a tradition of con-
sidering biological development from this perspective. An organism is 
often thought of as determined by either its genetics or its environment 
or, in many arguments, some hybrid between the two. Oyama has been 
especially critical of this traditional framework seeing it as equivalent to 
the dualist perspectives that apportion responsibility between the physi-
cal and the ethereal in many other fields. She notes that, in these cases, 
the organism itself is often ‘the passive recipient’ of these forces and no 
account is made of its activity.2 Developmental Systems Theory seeks 
to understand development through ‘cycles of contingency’ rather than 
through predetermination by external forces. Traditional notions of cau-
sality and agency are casualties of this perspective.
The framework being proposed here applies to more than biological and 
social systems. It is, in my view, far more general. It is a framework from 
which I can come to understand my perceptual processes and construc-
tion of reality. What this shift in perspective implies for perception is that 
the experience that I take to be objective facts, not only about the world, 
but about the nature of myself, are patterns that seems to persist in time 
due to their continual recreation. What I perceive is not the signals that 
come from the biological transducers, and is not the thing itself (which 
can only be approached by means of those signals, in any case), but 
patterns of invariants that are continually reproduced by the confluence 
of similar dynamics. The organism and its environment are like standing 
waves. 
The project of understanding things in terms of processes rather than ob-
jects and forces can be of value to our understanding of design activity 
in general and of architecture in particular. This new focus may yield a 
different set of insights into what we do and thereby change the way in 
1	 	Taylor	(2001)	p.312
2	 	Oyama	(1992)
Ian Stewart19 notes that mathematics may not reflect the structure of the 
world as much as it reflects the structure of the mind that then interprets 
its experiences in terms of the patterns available to it by preparation. In 
much the same manner, the task of understanding a personal practice 
develops not out of elements that are inherent to the practice, but from 
the way in which that practice predisposes the application of certain pat-
terns or explanations. The nature of the practice sets up frameworks from 
which descriptions of the practice can be drawn. In the effort to describe 
my design process, wide ranges of possible descriptions have been at-
tempted. Reference communities, for example, was an organizing device 
that highlighted the role of social networks in the critique, support, or re-
inforcement of ways of thinking and ways of working. Examining commu-
nities of practice allowed me an understanding of the way occupational 
requirements and conditions shaped the direction of my work. But these 
ways of describing the work seemed, to me, to be externally imposed 
and while suitable for illuminating aspects of the practice never achieved 
satisfying fit.
This is a description of practice from the first person perspective cover-
ing a series of transitions that have occurred over time. The description 
is taken from the temporal end of the series and organizes the preceding 
experiences from that position. This perspective privileges the kinds of 
pattern that are available to the task of organizing a body of work. Like 
Stewart’s mathematicians, the mind has been prepared. In the present 
case, the preparation has occurred though the course of the activities that 
are the topic of discussion and so the process is understood in terms of 
this temporary endpoint—the question defined by the answer, the prob-
lem defined by its solution. In this regard, the task shares one of the dis-
tinguishing features of design, that it is a wicked problem. 
Once one has come to reject objectivity it is no longer possible to take 
the position that there is a single accurate description of a body of work. 
Rather, there can only be descriptions that are more or less cohesive in 
their relation to a configuration of other understandings. For this reason, 
the constellation of presently held understandings, here arrived at through 
a sequence of design activities, must drive the interpretation of the work. 
In this case, the work wraps back onto itself in an intensely recursive way 
and the old work is re-interpreted in light of the new. While this may pro-
vide new insights, at times, this process can also be experienced as a kind 
of entrapment. How can I determine what constitutes a desirable degree 
of cohesiveness in my own thought? Is this cohesion or ossification? Is this 
an aesthetic judgment, a culturally conditioned preference for simplic-
ity and elegance? For my work, it can better be understood as a design 
decision. Perhaps common to all accounts of design is to find within the 
activity itself the framework for its understanding; for wicked problems a 
wicked discipline. 
19	 	Stewart,	I.	(1989)	p.7
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cuses on the creation of objects rather that the configuration of processes. 
So, I have criticized where I started as a designer, advocating for where I 
am now. Therefore I will begin describing the transitions in my practice by 
relating how I came to hold the process-oriented position that leads me to 
account for my practice as a dynamic process. 
My own education came at a time when the architectural principles 
movement initiated by the Texas Rangers3 had filtered through Cornell. 
Cornell had rangers Rowe and Seligmen, Cooper had Hedjuk. Younger 
architects trained in this tradition dominated Columbia’s faculty and its 
pedagogy. The system had matured by the time I attended; each semester 
had a defined role. It was clear what you were supposed to do.
We were educated by knowledge and analysis of the architectural canon, 
principally, though not exclusively, western-tradition. My admission to 
the program was no doubt due in part to my having studied architectural 
history at the University of Chicago, an education that consisted of five 
graduate-level courses in the architecture of the Renaissance under Earl 
Rosenthal (early, late, northern, eastern and Iberian4). Columbia’s course-
work developed analytic techniques for evaluating prior work and with 
some creative leaps one could see how these lessons, or templates, might 
be incorporated into new work. But to some, this did not appear to ex-
haust the possibilities and one had the sense that we were trapped within 
a hermetic disciplinary and formal framework. 
I began design practice by designing objects, buildings, interior spaces, 
furniture and so on. My initial work in a professional context was pro-
foundly conventional. Most of the firms that I worked in had principals 
that had been educated when post-modernism still had a little fire in it 
and so formal historical references almost always had a place in the work. 
Sometimes, the work was generally modern with just a blush of naughty 
historicism to make it seem fresh and up to date. In other cases, the work 
was just downright goofy—a pastiche of decontexturalized historical ref-
erences that were assumed have populist appeal despite complete igno-
rance of architectural history on the part of the public. Generally, I was 
disgusted by the design work, but realized that was not what I was there 
to learn.
There was widespread discontent and a growing cynicism with this ap-
proach to architectural design but an alternative way forward was not 
evident. I was fortunate to be a part of a small group in New York who 
met regularly to have discussions about the direction of architecture—Pe-
ter Pfau, Wes Jones, Neil Denari, Chris Scholz, Ken Kaplan and I. This is 
not the place to cover the content of those conversations or the activities 
of this group, but it is interesting that in retrospect, we all reacted to the 
rampant formalism of the post-modern with a different (and obviously 
much better) formalism of our own. Our work was inspired more by the 
industrial or utilitarian and the technological, rather than the historical or 
architectural. Vehicles were of particular interest. Some of this work was 
drawn together in Building: Machines (Pamphlet Architecture 12). 
The work that Ken Kaplan and I did, as brought together in Mosquitos: 
handbook for survival 5 shows an intense interest in form, not only in the 
objects, but in the text itself. Our intent was to produce a manifesto of 
3	 	The	Texas	Rangers	were	a	group	of	faculty	that	taught	together	at	the	Univer-
sity	of	Texas-Austin	during	the	1950s.	Their	principle	break	with	the	extant	peda-
gogy	 the	US	was	 their	belief	 that	 fundamental	 architectural	principles	 could	be	
extracted	by	the	analysis	of	individual	works	of	architecture	and	that	these	prin-
ciples	could	be	reapplied	to	the	design	of	new	works.	Colin	Rowe	is	perhaps	their	
most	influential	propagandist.
4	 	Rosenthal	(1961)
5	 	Kaplan	and	Krueger	(1993)
which we engage in our chosen activities. 
Architecture has been understood as an enduring object designated by a 
singular author. These are perhaps two of the great myths of our profes-
sion, a tacit understanding often supported by our education and social-
ization into the profession. The identification of a building is, almost with-
out exception, by attribution to one person. Within education, the object 
being designed is most often spoken about as real and is the subject of 
the discourse, rather than reviewing the process of design in relation to 
the individual (or team) developing the projection. In the States, historic 
preservation privileges the original design, materials, and paint colors of 
a building suggesting that any alterations that occur thereafter are in some 
way inferior or illegitimate. The assumption is that the object should be 
as originally intended and unchanging. Of course, these are only myths.
In contrast, to see the building or object as a ‘standing wave’ supported 
by a vast range of intersecting and contingent processes brings to light a 
whole range of factors. Economics, operations of political power and au-
thority, the production and integration of information and expertise from 
a wide range of sources, the availability and flows of materials, their abil-
ity to physically endure, the assemblies continued utility within social 
change and the effect of that change within the built environment, the ef-
fects of and effects on human activity, what has happened on the adjacent 
sites, and so on, all contribute to the production and maintenance of what 
we think of as an object and which appears to us to be relatively stable 
at certain temporal and physical scales. Large portions of American cit-
ies have undergone dramatic changes within a decade. Considering the 
condition of Detroit, stability is largely an apparition. The process view is 
in accord with the understanding of atomic scale dynamics that we are 
given in physics, as well as the dynamics at a geological perspective. It 
is a function not only of human temporal and physical scales, but of the 
framework with which we choose to work.
It is from this dynamical perspective that I will reflect upon my practice 
as a designer. What I draw from this perspective is that a practice is not 
something to objectify: rather to I seek to identify its development over 
time and to understand some of the principle dynamics involved. From 
this personal case study, I hope to illuminate some of the ways in which a 
transformation of practice occurs.
I will identify several key shifts that have taken place over the course of 
twenty-five years choosing from writings and projects that are contained 
in the appendix in order to illustrate or evidence the transformations that 
I have identified. This consideration of work will follow two distinct tra-
jectories. The first, that which will be covered in this chapter, deals with 
transformations in the subject matter of the design activity. The second 
tracks the objective of the design activity and will be covered in the fol-
lowing chapter.
In this chapter, I will track what I consider to be the principal shifts that 
have occurred in what I design. Here, I’m not referring to shifts in the 
program-type or scale, for example from the residential to the institu-
tional. Instead, the shift is from designing objects based on their formal 
and material configurations to designing them primarily with respect to 
their behaviors. This trajectory is further transformed into designing the 
interface and the interaction that this could engender between humans 
and the material world, and finally, I have become interested in designing 
the experience itself. 
In the previous chapter, I posited that the reflective consideration of a 
practice takes place from a position that the practice itself has prepared. I 
have also just criticized a traditional understanding of architecture that fo-
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Most objects moved and many had dynamic lighting, though this may 
not be apparent from the photographs. Motors and solenoids coupled 
to complex switching and timing produced a shifting soundscape. Some 
pieces had embedded recordings. We intended that the addition of sound 
and motion would shift the work from set of objects to be viewed into an 
environment that could be experienced.
The first project to integrate motion and sound was an installation that 
was undertaken for the School of Architecture at Columbia University.
We had some idea of what Pfau/Jones and Denari would make,6 as their 
work had always stayed much closer to architecture as a building. But, 
the robotic and animatronic held more fascination for us than the archi-
tectural. In order to free up the formal possibilities, we decided to hang 
our work in a skylight and thereby to position it between the library and 
a reviewing space hopefully disrupting both. Once the ground plane was 
abandoned, we developed an expression that was bilaterally symmet-
ric but recalling organisms rather than architecture. We were looking for 
something with a bit of Gregor Samsa in it. Then we began the task of 
making it move, shake and breathe.
From Object to Behavior
Collaboration often involves some degree of specialization. Much of the 
technical development was my responsibility, and I recall always working 
beyond my competence. For this project, we needed to be able to con-
trol lights, motors and blowers and to develop machine choreography. 
Fortunately, a sales engineer sketched a switching scheme for the motors 
we purchased from him and the rest I could puzzle out myself, but it was 
clear that this kind of work would require a new knowledge base. 
It was about the time that Halley’s Comet made its appearance and I had 
some interest in astronomy, particularly amateur telescope making. I built 
a telescope using lenses from a photocopier and an 8mm movie projec-
tor that enabled me to see the comet from my rooftop in Manhattan; a 
very difficult task for such a faint object in a light polluted sky. However, 
my interest wasn’t focused on observation, but in the techniques used to 
build and control telescopes. This community had developed techniques 
for rubbing together two pieces of glass in someone’s garage and thereby 
figuring a parabola accurate to a tenth the wavelength of light. There were 
control systems for pointing, tracking, and measuring astronomical phe-
nomena at high resolution. This community knew how to build kinetic 
machines and to make them move with precision. One of the first tech-
nical books I in my library was Microprocessor Control of Telescopes.7 
Another source of information about mechanisms and control systems 
was, of course, robotics.
From Form to Behavior
As knowledge accumulated, always somewhat behind the ambition, I 
found that the interest and challenge in the work gradually shifted over 
from the form to the behavior of the machines; but this took several years. 
The first task was to be able to create behaviors, and for this I was poorly 
educated not only in the ability to technically execute a design, but also 
in my ability to think about behavior rather than form. 
This transition, from an interest in form to an interest in behavior can be 
6	 	 Three	 teams	made	 up	 the	 “Installed	Mechanisms”	 exhibition.	 Each	worked	
directly	with	a	small	number	of	Columbia’s	architecture	students	to	produce	the	
installations.
7	 	Genet	and	Trueblood	(1985)	
sorts, unlike any other that we had encountered; something that could 
convey our discontents and set a position in relation to them. There was 
a carefully calibrated level of abrasiveness in the work, the writing, and 
the graphics. We considered form to be our principle vehicle of com-
munication, but understood form to work across all of these modes of 
communication.
The objects in that publication were constructed primarily in a studio 
space sublet from a sculptor on 22nd Street in the Chelsea district of Man-
hattan, just a bit beyond the Highline trestle. Kaplan and I worked in 
architecture offices during the day; so much of the work in the studio 
was a late night operation. During the day, this district on the edge of 
the Manhattan was dominated by industrial and warehouse activity. At 
night, it was a haven for transvestite prostitution, drug dealers, a small 
community of homeless men, and a pair of malcontent designers build-
ing machines as architectural polemics. One evening many years later, 
I attended an opening at Max Protetch’s Gallery and was astonished to 
discover that it was now across the street from what had been our studio. 
That would have been inconceivable to us when we played a part in the 
nocturnal activity of 22nd Street years before. The work that we produced 
in this cultural and technical context was quite compatible with it—on 
the edge, if not slightly over.
Much of the material from which we worked was obtained from the nu-
merous dumpsters that could be found between the studio and my day 
job on 5th avenue and 21st. At the time, Manhattan was divided into dis-
tricts relating to trades or ethnicities. The office was in the printing and 
photography district that was also a convenient location for an architect’s 
office. In the late 1980s, printing was undergoing a fundamental shift 
based on the nascent digital graphics revolution and a host of new print-
ing technologies. Fortunately, a fair amount of the obsolete hardware end-
ed up in the trash where we could access it. For a time I carried a tool kit 
in my pack so that I could strip out the interesting bits from an abandoned 
machine should I happen upon one. The studio held a quantity of this 
machine salvage, not only the specialized technical parts, but also any 
thing that looked interesting at the time. 
We built much of the work by assembling what was at hand. Often the 
work proceeded without prior intent, but the available was brought to-
gether to see what it would suggest or inspire. But we did not simply 
use these things to make a composition; rather, we learned how to make 
things by reference to the technologies we incorporated. At one point, I 
disassembled a photocopy machine and at the end, was left with several 
hundred fasteners. I decided to sort them out for potential reuse in a later 
project. When I was finished, I was surprised to find just four types—
large, medium small and odd. All assembly tasks were grouped into three 
sizes with the exception of a few very specialized needs. The last category 
made up less than 10% of the total. This was a good lesson in designing a 
machine and in stocking parts. 
Early test or medical equipment, 1970s era, was often made by hand. 
Point-to-point wiring and wire-wrap techniques intrigued us. They were 
both baffling and beautiful. There was an internal logic that, while clearly 
present, was also totally opaque to us; an alien logic. We also admired 
the directness of many of the machines we collected once the plastic 
stylized housings were removed. A collage of technological components 
stripped from printing equipment resulted in objects designed by refer-
ence to another logic—a logic that was internal to the object. We did not 
aspire to functionality; instead, we wanted to use the compositional pos-
sibilities to communicate about architecture and the culture in which we 
were embedded. So our interest was neither in architectural or machine 
logics but in something else; a logic that could be used to communicate. 
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They included artificial intelligence and robotics, new materials, intel-
ligent structures and skins, electronic arts, and artificial life. One student 
characterized the course as a seminar in “the stuff that Ted likes”, a rea-
sonably accurate description. It was in fact a distillation of extensive read-
ing driven by intuition that certain of these things would be interesting 
and useful to architecture.
The first independent project I undertook following the collaborative ad-
ventures with Ken Kaplan was a commission for an installation in the 
outdoor sculpture garden of the Katonah Museum (see Appendix A)8 . 
One of the first decisions that I made was to tightly circumscribe the 
formal language of the project to in order to focus attention on the be-
havior. I also wanted to develop a different identity in the new work and 
so chose a spare expression to contrast with the previously more effusive 
formal language developed with Kaplan. Several aspects of this project 
co-evolved with the seminar in Technology Transfer that I was teaching 
at the time. The installation used shape memory alloy wires as actuators, 
its control algorithms were based on cellular automata, developed over 
a non-uniform lattice, and it used the properties of the alloys to develop 
responsiveness to environmental conditions. 
Here the dynamics of the work were considerably more complex than in 
the previous projects. The installation was constructed on a pair of rect-
angular bases. Mat switches on a walkway between them registered the 
presence of visitors and initiated activity within groups of carbon-fiber 
composite rods9 extending from the bases. A pair of shape memory alloy 
wires bent the rod over or to one side or the other. The presence of the vis-
itor did not control this activity, however. The activity spread through the 
population of rods by means of a modified cellular automata algorithm. 
The shape memory effect in the alloy is temperature dependent. Com-
puter control of the activity is implemented by directing flows of electric-
ity to the wires activating them with resistance heating. Because the thin 
wires have such a low mass to surface area ratio, the ambient temperature 
affects the heating and cooling of the wires and so the speed and intensity 
of the reaction varies throughout the day and with the season. 
In this project, I hoped that a visitor would understand that they were 
instigating but not controlling activity within the piece. This was for me 
analogous with the way in which we are embedded within the both the 
technological and biological worlds. I tried to create a context that could 
bring both of these associations to mind simultaneously. I also was inter-
ested in the particular gestural quality of the motion rather than simply 
the fact that it occurred. In this installation, the visitor’s engagement with 
the work consisted of a visual experience. There was no sound. 
This is not because the acoustics were ignored, but because they were 
carefully considered. I was interested in the shape memory alloy as a 
‘solid state’ or non-mechanical actuator—an actuator with no moving 
parts. Some of this interest was purely pragmatic; it is very difficult to 
build kinetic work that will run reliably for weeks or months without 
maintenance, especially if it is located outdoors. Eliminating mechanical 
parts was an excellent way to increase reliability. In its low-temperature 
phase the metal is highly ductile and stretches under the bias force of the 
composite rod, shortening again when resistance heated. The change in 
the diameter of the wire cannot be seen. To have a wire change its length 
is also uncommon and unexpected. So, it is difficult to ascertain how 
the movement is effected; and it is completely silent. In contrast to the 
previous work in which the operation of the technology provided the 
ambient sound, I wanted the work as a whole to remain silent, and so 
8	 	Krueger,	T.	(1995)	
9	 	These	were	purchased	from	a	fishing	equipment	manufacturer.
traced across three projects; the installation at Columbia; GigaBips, one 
of the RenegadeCities projects; and the installation at ArtPark. 
With the Columbia Installation the problem was to control electrical 
components; motors, lights, and fans. This involved the use of motor-con-
trolled switching techniques in which everything was determined by the 
physical configuration of the switches. The controls incorporated a degree 
of variability in order to tune the activity, initially in the shop, but also 
again once installed.
GigaBips included a series of hand-wired circuit boards. Because this 
work was electronic rather than electrical, it was necessary to become 
conversant in a completely new technology. One of the circuit boards I 
created drove a speaker with a tone determined by an oscillator circuit in 
which resistors set the frequency and amplitude. By substituting a photo-
resister, the tone varied with the intensity of light. The work was placed 
in the gallery so that as a visitor approached they would step between a 
track-mounted spotlight and the circuit causing the piece to respond. We 
called this strategy ‘siting and lighting’.
The Installation at ArtPark opened up a new possibility because we were 
given a budget that allowed for the purchasing of the components nec-
essary to build a special purpose computer to control the response of 
the machine to visitors to the park. In this case, the level of technical 
complexity increased dramatically and included learning a programming 
language and its logic. Motion detectors monitored the major approaches 
to the work and the computer executed variable response sequences for 
each approach and for all combinations. Again, the system was com-
pletely deterministic, but at a much more complex level of behavior. It 
was unlikely that visitors would understand the way in which the behav-
ior was programmed in the course of their visit and our intent was to have 
the work appear both autonomous and to some degree intelligent. This 
was accomplished by the choreography of the particular response made 
to each combination of input variables. The interest was in the way in 
which the behavior of the machine communicated a reaction to the pres-
ence of the visitor—what we called at the time it’s ”Artificial Personality”.
I had begun to teach at Columbia and coordinate the elective courses in 
the technology curriculum. Deconstructivism was dominating the School 
in the design studios and in general technology was not considered to 
be ‘interesting’. I was asked to put together a set of courses that would 
change that perception. One element of that shift was my development 
of the Seminar in Technology Transfer. Significant input into the ultimate 
shape of the course came from a volume containing thousands of ab-
stracts of NASA developed or sponsored research which I went through 
in some detail. Also, one of the advantages of an academic position at 
that time was that it provided access to the pre-web Internet. Many tech-
nologically oriented academic labs and some government agencies had 
a significant presence on the ‘net at this time. Because I wanted to create 
and control movement I had a particular interest in robotics and artificial 
intelligence. I was attracted to the work at the Artificial Intelligence Labo-
ratory at MIT because there was an influential group of researchers there 
that understood that AI did not have to be concerned with world models, 
search algorithms, and syntax, but should be concerned about embodi-
ment, situatedness, and layered control systems built out of simple reac-
tive elements. This was both intelligible and useful.
In retrospect, the development of this seminar had a significant impact 
on much of what followed. It began the habit of reading widely, and 
sometimes deeply in fields that are nominally outside of my own and 
then drawing this information together in a ways that make it available to 
designers. The readings and discussions in the seminar were far ranging. 
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We used these technologies to produce overlays of some of the building 
systems inside Feiner’s lab. The location and orientation of the users head 
was tracked and the display was updated accordingly. This allowed for 
the overlay of, in the example shown, reinforcing bars within the concrete 
structure. The intent was that one had a kind of ‘x-ray’ vision of the rein-
forcement through the finishes and concrete cover. The implementation 
was completely instrumental and the additional information visual only. 
The interest in this project for me was the opportunity to use the technol-
ogy developed by Feiner and MacIntyre to interface with architectural 
content that could have pedagogical value. 
In 1996 I had a full-time teaching opportunity as the E. Fay Jones Visit-
ing Professor at the University of Arkansas, a position I held for three 
years. This gave me the opportunity to develop the Seminar on Intelligent 
Environments. This course was a rolling transformation of the Technol-
ogy Transfer seminar that came to focus less on new technologies and 
increasingly on the nature of intelligence and intelligent systems. It drew 
heavily on embodied and situated robotics and the parallel theories of 
intelligence and perception in humans. The general thrust of the course 
was to suggest equivalence between embodied and situated agents and to 
sketch out the nature of their interactions. 
Materials related to my seminar were available on a website. I received an 
email from a professor of Artificial Intelligence and Robotics inviting me 
to lunch. He was surprised to find that material so familiar to him would 
be a part of architecture. After several conversations, I became a member 
of the Emergent Computations Group, the architect among engineers and 
mathematicians and was invited for a presentation at the Midwest Confer-
ence on Artificial Intelligence. Much of the material from the seminar was 
brought together in this invited paper called ‘Interfaces to Non-Symbolic 
Media’11 that is available in Appendix D. This paper details the shift in the 
intellectual substrate of my thinking that made possible a shift in the ob-
jective of my design work from creating an experience for someone to de-
veloping a substrate from which they created their own. This represented, 
for me, a radical departure in how I understood the place of design to an 
activity that was far more open, perhaps generous, in what it intended.
While doing a workshop and lecture at Rice in Houston, I had an oppor-
tunity to reconnect with an architect I had met years before in New York 
who was working at NASA. This provided the opportunity to undertake 
several design studios in collaboration with the Habitability and Human 
Factors Group at the Johnson Space Center. The arrangement that we 
worked out was to engage the architecture students in my studio with real 
design problems faced by NASA. Typically these were drawn from situ-
ations in which technical feasibility alone did not accommodate human 
needs and comfort sufficiently. I was to review a number of possibilities 
and select ones that had particular pedagogical value.  I had no interest in 
larger scale design problems. These seemed to be almost completely de-
termined by the nature of the physical conditions. They required pressure-
dominated structural systems, and so every design was based on spherical 
or cylindrical geometries. The result was that the design of a lunar or 
planetary base seemed little more challenging than an arrangement of 
yogurt cups in a sandbox. 
Instead I preferred problems in which there was a close coupling between 
a human and the design product. The first of these involved the design of 
work surfaces for astronauts in the International Space Station12 (see Ap-
pendix E). For the second studio, we were invited to consider habitation 
strategies for a mission scenario called Mars Reference Mission 4, which 
11		Krueger,	T.	(2001)
12		Krueger,	T.	(2000)	
the controller, power supplies and associated ventilation were selected 
and configured in order to preserve the quiet. This strategy was effec-
tive, and the impression that one had was that the rods were moving ‘by 
themselves’. They did not seem mechanical or machine-like. One regis-
tered the slow, fluid, graceful, and gestural movement against a minimal-
ist formal expression. In this project both the sound and the form were 
deliberately minimized so that the behavior of the work could be read 
most prominently.
From Behavior to Interface
When I was educated as an architect, statics was a required course—dy-
namics wasn’t even an elective. The desire to make kinetic work lead 
eventually to designing work that was focused primarily on its behaviors, 
due to some extent because my own efforts were focused there as well. 
The following projects, Architectural Anatomy and the Media-Augmented 
eXercise Machine (MAXM) bring the interface itself forward as the subject 
of design.
Simon Penny invited me to present the Katonah installation at The Inter-
national Society for Electronic Arts conference in Montreal in 1995 as 
part of a panel on the “Aesthetics of Real Space Interactives”. The pur-
pose of the panel was to develop a discourse about interaction in three-
dimensional space. Penny noted that although there were long critical 
traditions for two-dimensional media, interaction in ‘real space’ had no 
counterpart. My paper for the conference is in the appendix as previ-
ously noted. While the results of the panel were certainly not conclusive, 
it focused my attention on the issue of interactivity. At the conference, I 
became acquainted with a number of practitioners that had similar inter-
ests and in addition, became aware that a global community of electronic 
artists was doing work that was closer to my practice than that undertaken 
by my colleagues in architecture. I also met Roy Ascott who sponsored 
the conference series Consiousness Reframed: Art and Consciousness in 
the Post-Biological Era that became the outlet for a number of the papers 
included here.10 At these conferences, I met Ranulph Glanville.
During this same time, I was also co-teaching capstone systems integra-
tion course called ‘Technical and Utilitarian Systems’ with Anthony Web-
ster, a structural engineer. In a discussion about developing a suitable 
textbook for this kind of course, I suggested that it might use the same 
kind of clear acetate overlay pages that were frequently used to show ana-
tomical structures in anatomy textbooks or encyclopedia. I suggested that 
the text be called Architectural Anatomy. While the textbook was never 
produced, this idea was developed using more advanced technologies in 
collaboration with Webster and with Steven Feiner and Blair MacIntyre of 
the Computer Science Department at Columbia.
Feiner was one of the leading developers of ‘Augmented Reality’ technol-
ogy. This research agenda sought to supplement one’s normal perception 
of the world with additional information. While Virtual Reality sought to 
replace one reality with another at tremendous economic, technological 
and computational cost, in many applications, humans already created 
reality quite well, there was no need to duplicate or replace it, but per-
haps certain additional information would be useful. Augmented Reality 
was a series of techniques for tracking users in space and correlating their 
position within a digital model of the same space holding additional in-
formation. This additional information was overlain onto the visual field 
by means of a ‘heads-up’ display.
10		‘On	the	Design	of	Organisms’,	‘There	is	No	Intelligence’,	and	‘Nonsense’	as	well	
as	‘An	Architecture	of	Autonomy’	and	‘Heterotic	Architecture’
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viscosity to the slope of the terrain on a virtual planetary landscape con-
trolling the magnetic field strength.
What distinguishes this design project from those that I had undertaken 
before, was the recognition that the user created the experience and so 
the technology need not attempt to produce it for them, instead, the task 
was to create a situation that the user found engaging. We required a 
person to do work in specific ways to operate the interface relying on the 
body itself to produce heat, sweat, and fatigue when it had worked hard 
or to feel out of balance when it leaned to change directions. This aspect 
of the interface was completely absent from the ‘augmented reality’ work 
at Columbia; although in retrospect this seems odd. This project is a di-
rect descendant from it. It takes the position that the user already creates 
‘reality’, the reality of experience, well enough, all that is needed is to 
supplement that with enough additional information to make it engaging. 
This seemed to work quite well. 
One aspect of the design that took a lot of development was the geometry 
of the lateral rockers that enabled directional control in the virtual envi-
ronment. The shape needed to balance agility, the ability to move with 
facility from side-to-side about the centerline, with increasing stability as 
one moved far from the center. The development of these kinds of balance 
curves is difficult because they need to accommodate the users shifting 
the center of gravity in response to the movement of the object caused 
by the shifting. I met a custom furniture maker who was building elabo-
rate bent-laminated rocking chairs who had, after several unsuccessful 
attempts at designing his own shape, simply traced the curve of an old 
rocking chair and used that in all his future designs. We had no such tem-
plate for our purposes and so developed the shape by iteration and testing 
in the prototyping phases. However, when the machine was on exhibition 
in Portugal, I was surprised at how much more vigorously it was used than 
any of our own testing had suggested. Indeed I watched one user, who 
must have been enjoying the experience, rock the machine repeatedly up 
onto the points of the rockers almost flipping it over. We had designed for 
‘engagement’ but had not sufficiently prepared for success.
From Interface to Experience
One significant difference between this project and the previous work is 
that it focuses on the embodiment of the user, and appropriately so for an 
exercise machine. This shift in perspective came from the development 
of the Seminar on Intelligent Environments, which, as noted above, had 
been influenced by previous NASA-based studios. In particular, the per-
ceptual difficulties in both virtual and microgravity environments could 
be best accounted for by the sensori-motor account of perception. This 
framework also gave the clearest indication for how we might proceed 
in the development of our exercise machine. It allowed us to enable the 
self-generated experience of the user in the service of the multiple goals 
that we had set for the project. Each theory of perception suggests differ-
ent design approaches. But the transition from information-based under-
standings of perception to the sensori-motor view had the potential for a 
more fundamental shift in the objectives of my design activity. I realized 
that the sensori-motor account of perception suggested that one might be 
able to design perception itself. 
As evidence for their sensori-motor account of visual perception, O’Regan 
and Noe16 cite as an example the work done with sensory substitution 
devices by Paul Bach-y-Rita and colleagues. In these experiments, the 
output of a video camera was transduced to the skin’s surface using an 
array of vibratory tactors.  Under certain conditions, when the signal 
16		O’Regan	and	Noe	(2001)
was then under development. The value to me as a teacher was that the 
microgravity conditions required every solution be developed from first 
principles rather than from architectural rules of thumb or unconscious 
cultural habits. In addition, the chosen projects required the consider-
ation of the design from a careful analysis of the conditions and objec-
tives of use. In both of these studio projects, the physiological adapta-
tion to micro-gravity conditions was of significant concern. What became 
obvious through these studies was that the physiological adaptivity of 
human beings was extensive. I began to see that what we understand to 
be our nature was simply the state of an adaptive organism stabilized by 
a common physics in which we, almost all, are enmeshed.13 This kind of 
problem fit well within the context of the seminar as it was developing 
and in turn influenced its future direction significantly. 
The rapid muscular and skeletal adjustment to microgravity requires vig-
orous physical training in order to slow the loss of bone and muscle mass. 
But, the design of exercise machines specifically for micro-gravity had not 
been undertaken. I decided to offer a studio that considered this problem 
and then to approach NASA with the results in the form of a working pro-
totype. At about the same time, I was invited to do an installation at the 
Bienale de Cascais in Portugal and so decided to exhibit the work on the 
exercise machine. I was interested in the opportunity to combine work 
that was targeted both at techno-scientific and cultural venues.14
This project marks a significant change in the way the design engages the 
user. From the previous design studios we were aware that the technical 
feasibility of a project does not make it successful. The human compo-
nent of a mission was recognized as ‘mission critical’. So in the design an 
exercise machine for micro-gravity, the physiological functionality of the 
machine would be necessary but not sufficient. I had noticed the striking 
similarity between problems of adjustment and perceptual adaptation in 
virtual environments and those in micro-gravity that I was calling ‘the 
relationship between ZeroG and VE’. Perhaps this association was what 
prompted the idea that the way to deal with the human factors dimen-
sion of long hours of exercise would be to make the exercise machine 
the interface to a virtual environment. We15 foresaw that a variety of over-
lapping activities could be integrated with the exercise activity, allowing 
for psychological, physiological, training or scientific objectives in to be 
met using resources that would exist on the spacecraft in any case, but 
not necessarily being linked in the manner that we suggested. MAXM is 
documented in the Appendix F.
One problem that was encountered with the existing exercise machines 
on the International Space Station is that they were often broken and 
there could be long waits for repair or replacement. I was interested in 
seeing if another ‘solid-state’ actuator could help with the reliability as 
I had found previously and I had retained an interest in and had done 
further research into adaptive materials that I began at Columbia. Both 
the prototype we demonstrated at the Johnson Space Center and the re-
cumbent bike interface we built for exhibition used a, then recently de-
veloped, magneto-rheological brake. This device is based on a fluid with 
a viscosity that varies with the strength of a magnetic field. We linked the 
13		Krueger,	T.	(2000a)
14		I	recently	had	an	opportunity	to	offer	a	project	with	a	similar	mix	of	venues—
another	NASA	Studio	that	had	as	its	objective	the	design	of	a	medical	operations	
workstation	for	lunar	or	planetary	deployment.	The	schematic	designs	were	ex-
hibited	at	 the	Experimental	Media	and	Performing	Arts	Center	at	Rensselaer	as	
part	of	an	exhibition	on	art	and	microgravity.	The	designs	were	also	presented	to	
NASA	and	a	working	prototype	was	built,	delivered	to	NASA,	and	underwent	test-
ing	on	a	lava	flow	in	Arizona	in	August	2010.
15		‘We’	refers	to	the	design	team	that	worked	on	the	project	as	credited	in	the	ap-
pendix.	
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accommodated it may be possible to redesign the envelope of sensitivity 
of the human sensorium. Several devices that would do this have been 
developed. These are set out in the paper Devices for the Perception of 
Magnetic Fields19 that is included in Appendix H. 
From a cognitivist positivism to an embodied constructivism
As I review the start of my designing I recognize a certain consistency in 
having a practice focused on the designing of objects, a cognitivist un-
derstanding of intelligence and perception and a positivist philosophical 
framework. 
When one believes that the process of perception is fundamentally one 
of information transfer, then the nature of the information and methods 
for its transfer become paramount. The work in augmented reality, such 
as the Architectural Anatomy project, is solidly within this tradition. The 
movement of a user is tracked and this data is used to edit, transfer, and 
display certain information for the user in relation to the person’s position. 
The space in which the operations take place is universal and metricized. 
It has only geometric properties and the user has status within the system 
in relation to location and orientation of their head. The user is essentially 
a passive receiver of the information brought to it by the technological 
system, but they are not an integral element. The essence of the work can 
be accurately captured by a camera located place of the user because the 
output of the device is only visual.
To a great extent the installation at the Katonah Museum can accept much 
of the same criticism. While much of the content of the work has to do 
with the activity that is outside of the involvement of the visitor, the un-
derstanding that they are to take away from the work comes from observa-
tion and consideration—there is a clear detachment that is not present in 
the exercise machine.
A good example or reference point might be the paper Interactivity and 
Control20 that is linked to the installation at the Katonah Museum. In this 
project, the behavior of the piece is driven by algorithms based on cellu-
lar automata and was directly influenced by work being done in Artificial 
Life. While my objective was not to make a living system, I did want to 
create life-like behaviors and did this by means of computational tech-
niques. It is tempting to see within the careful use of the shape memory 
wires to achieve certain behaviors a pre-disposition towards an embodied 
perspective, but at the time, I was more interested in it as an instance 
of ‘physical computation’: “Each rod constitutes a finite state machine 
implemented in hardware and assumes a position based on the state of 
the surrounding rods or the switches in a manner similar to cellular au-
tomata.” While the interest in this work was, for me, its behavior and not 
its form, it is still conceived as an object external to the viewer, and au-
tonomous, and one regarded through detached observation.
Similarly, the positions that I hold today also seem consistent, and to 
some significant extent, this consistency has been brought about in vir-
tue of having undertaken the PhD focused on ones own design practice. 
Now, experience has become the objective of my design activity, work 
from an understanding that perception is both embodied and situated and 
I hold a constructivist perspective. The alignment of these three patterns 
is what one would expect.
But the development of the transition in the interim is discontinuous and 
often inconsistent. For example, I became interested in artificial intel-
ligence as a by-product of the need to acquire skills that were prevalent 
19		Krueger,	T.	(2007)	
20		Krueger,	T.	(1995)	
transformed in response to volitional movements and with learning, the 
subject was able to perceive objects in the environment. I remember hav-
ing heard about this research in a course on perceptual psychology in 
the mid-1970s. I recall that it was ‘interesting’, but I do not think that I 
understood it as a challenge to theories of perception, or anything else, 
and it wasn’t long before I had forgotten about it. 
In general, I have ‘always’ seen myself as becoming an architect, and did 
an eclectic sequence of studies for my bachelor’s degree as pre-architec-
tural study. While this included heavy doses of art and architecture his-
tory and the studio arts, much of the work was in sociology, psychology 
and the then new fields of social and environmental psychology. None 
of this research was investigated by designers or organized for design, 
although its application to design was always implied if not explicitly 
suggested. During my architectural education, I made no use of it in my 
design activity whatsoever. I could not see a way to implement these 
findings in a creative or productive way. I believe that no one else has 
figured it out either. The perspective was of value however, in that it gave 
me a critical position from which to observe the educational process that 
I was undergoing and some observational skills and sensitivity to human 
individual and social behavior that was more acute than that of most of 
my colleagues. The work of Bach-y-Rita would most certainly have joined 
much of my education in the social sciences in the category ‘interesting 
but largely irrelevant to what I’m trying to do as a designer’. One way to 
regard this work is to ask what its implications are for the design of some-
thing, or one can see it instead as something to design. It was the latter 
approach the intrigued me.
Bach-y-Rita worked in a Department of Rehabilitation Medicine and he 
intended and interpreted his devices as an artificial vision. The subjects in 
his experiments were blind and the changes brought about by the devices 
were interpreted as a form of sight. Lenay is critical of this interpreta-
tion.17 There are many distinctions between the details of Bach-y-Rita’s 
devices and normal human vision. Of course, there are similarities as 
well. The project of enumerating similarities and differences, evaluating 
their merits and deciding, ‘vision or not’, accepts vision and the division 
of perception into sense modalities as a valid decomposition. I have come 
to question primacy of the senses in the understanding of perception and 
brought together my thoughts on the matter in a paper called, appropri-
ately, ‘Nonsense’18 (available in Appendix G). 
My interpretation of sensory substitution, from the perspective of the in-
dividual user, is that it constitutes a new modality for them; an additional 
input into what is essentially the creative activity of pattern making that is 
perception. Sensory-substitution suggests that any structured result of ef-
ferent nervous activity could become a part of this pattern creation. If that 
was the case, then the human sensorium was open to design activity. It 
may be possible to construct devices that produce consistent and reliable 
relationships between spectra of which I am not now consciously aware 
and the other inputs into the perceptual process. I might for example be 
able to integrate a device that responds to magnetic field strength and 
orientation into our perceptual processes, or to become aware of certain 
chemical gradients, radioactivity and so on as the need and desire arose. 
The range of variation that a phenomenon is understood to have, or the 
range that is of interest, must be translated into and matched to the sensi-
tivity of the body. The device design must allow for volitional movements 
in order for the afferent-efferent correlations to occur and all this needs 
to be within human spatio-temporal scales. But, if these requirements are 
17		Lenay	et al	(2003)
18		Krueger,	T.	(2006)	
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The review of the nature of this transition has led me to become more 
aware of the process of transitioning from one pattern to the next. If I 
think about patternmaking in relationship other patterns that I hold, but 
do not become cognizant of the process of transformation, I will be less 
capable of guiding my students who are transitioning from one discipline 
to another. I have come to believe that an understanding of the overlaps, 
incompatibilities, holes and incomplete mergers of patterns will become 
the object of further study for me. Perhaps, an understanding of the pro-
cess, especially the sticking points, the frictions and viscosities, will assist 
me in creating pedagogical exercises that recognize the nature of this pro-
cess rather than the simple acknowledgement that it exists. Should I, as a 
teacher, facilitate the integration of patterns into consistent and cohesive 
wholes? Should I assume that states of integration are superior to the less 
organized tangle that seemed to characterize much of the time covered in 
this review? It may be that integration creates stasis rather than creativity. 
Perhaps the creativity is in the striving for order, and so, it is driven by the 
inconsistent. Should the inconsistent then be what I need to develop? For 
now, I will simply help them see the patterns—there may be many ways.
in robotics. I was attracted to an alternative approach to robotics that was 
both embodied and situated.21 This approach was highly critical of the 
cognitivist perspective that had dominated the field up to that time. I had 
read a substantial amount of the available material and had made use of 
it in my writings and seminars. 
In retrospect therefore, it seems odd that one could absorb much of this 
new framework and still be unaware that one’s own perspective had not 
fundamentally changed as noted above. But, that was the case. Perhaps, 
it is due to the fact that I required myself to become familiar with research 
in another discipline very quickly, without any formal training, and that 
this left little time for reflection. However, my interest here is not with 
justifying the existence of the inconsistency, but rather to take note of it 
and to think about how the experiences within my practice marked and 
perhaps facilitated the transition that was to eventually occur. 
I began this chapter with a consideration of pattern and the relation of 
one pattern to another. I noted that, in some cases, I actively accumulate 
misfits and anomalies in order to engage in the redesign of pattern.  This 
is not one of those times, but another equally prevalent situation in which 
the philosophical incompatibilities comes into awareness as a gradual 
unfolding and resolves in an equally gradual manner. In the example of 
the Katonah Museum installation, it is the questioning of the primacy of 
the formal and shift towards the behavioral properties of objects that, in 
retrospect, marks the beginning of a series of shifts ultimately resulting in 
the present position.
It takes quite some time before the embodied and situated perspective 
noted above appears in the work with the Media Augmented eXercise 
Machine. In the interim, I had expended my readings from Robotics and 
AI into a concern with human cognition and then also human embodi-
ment when confronted with the physiological challenges of micro-gravity 
in the NASA design studio series. Here, scholarship and teaching provide 
significant stimulus for transitions in design work. While the project is 
intimately concerned with the production of experience by the user of 
the device, and there is a rejection of cognitivist views of perception and 
cognition, this work had only prepared the ground for the shift to con-
structivism. This happens later with the perceptual prosthetics studies.  
The transition from one period of consistency to another is characterized 
by work, theory and philosophy that are, in the interim, hybrids. In There 
is No Intelligence, the hybrid condition can be found within passages 
such as this one. “[The concept of Intelligence] is however based entirely 
on the explanatory needs of the observer and not upon the structure the 
system itself”. To note that the explanation resides in the observer is en-
tirely consistent with my present perspective, however, there is also the 
presence of an external that exists in its own right and which needs to be 
investigated in order to unlock its real order. In this case, I can understand 
this position as the holding of simultaneously contradictory views, and 
indeed this how it appears today. 
However, I do not recall having any sense that this was so. In fact, I sug-
gest that it was not contradictory then and can only be described as such 
from the present perspective. In addition, I can imagine additional trans-
formations in my own views going forward and so may at some time in 
the future (who knows?) return to this understanding. I have with some 
frequency reminded my students that if one looks at history and sees the 
continuous evolution of ideas, it takes more than the available arrogance 
to assert that one has finally ‘figured it out’ once and for all. 
21		Brooks(1991),	Torrance	and	Stein	(1997),	Maes	(1990)
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Chapter Three
I’ve changed my mind
“The point of taking certain actions, therefore, is not for the effect they have on the environment 
as much as for the effect they have on the agent.”1 Kirsh and Maglio 
With this statement, David Kirsh and Paul Maglio have captured some-
thing of much interest to designers. While as a group our efforts are, 
almost by definition, focused on making changes to the environments 
that humans create and inhabit, much of our activity accomplishes little 
within that realm. Here, the concern is not with the fact that, for much 
design activity, the actual making of a building, product or object will be 
accomplished by the activity of others. But instead, that much of what we 
do in the course of design activity is an effort to understand, to come to 
terms with, the problem at hand. 
Kirsh and Maglio come to the distinction between the pragmatic and 
epistemic actions through a careful analysis of Tetris, historically one of 
the most popular computer games. The game is highly time-pressured and 
the authors found that, despite this, much of the activity in the game was 
not directly related to putting puzzle pieces into corresponding places. 
Instead, it was spent on a cognitive activity; solving the puzzle. In order 
to do this, the game players actively rotate the puzzle piece until an ap-
propriate match is perceived. Once the solution is grasped visually, the 
pragmatic activity of placing the piece is initiated. So solving the puzzle 
was accomplished by means of a direct perceptual matching between the 
shape of the piece and the shape of its place in the game, rather than by 
application of a mental logic. This activity nicely illustrates the close cou-
pling between perception, cognition and action for certain tasks.
In design, we easily recognize the distinction between the epistemic and 
the pragmatic in the kinds of drawings, models or other activities that are 
done to ‘generate and develop’ ideas as opposed to those made to ‘docu-
ment and present’ them. This is what Ranulph Glanville refers to as ‘mod-
els for’ vs. ‘models of’. In this chapter, I will consider the transformation in 
the objective of my design practice, finding a transition from designing in 
order to make changes in the environment, a pragmatic focus, to design-
ing in order to understand something in a new way, an epistemic focus. 
This shift occurs over the same time span as the shift from designing the 
object to crafting the experience that I reviewed in the last chapter and is 
intimately related to it. 
I understand my transitioning to focus more on epistemic than the prag-
matic implications of my work to be related, to some extent, to the shift 
of my practice to teaching. That a practice of teaching should transition 
to the epistemic does not seem surprising. Teaching does not involve the 
production of work to accommodate a client’s needs in the same way as 
architectural practice. While it can be argued that the design of a program 
or curriculum may be to address the needs of the students as clients, the 
product of that activity is much less what the faculty member has made 
and instead how work facilitates the cognitive and creative abilities of 
the student. The activity of teaching, or more properly and importantly as 
Ranulph Glanville has pointed out,2 the development of situations from 
which students learn, is a deeply epistemic activity. This transition does 
not take place at the same time as teaching begins, but over a period of 
time as experiences, knowledge and conversations accumulate. 
A shift into the epistemic
1	 	Kirsh	and	Maglio	(1994)
2	 	from	our	personal	conversations	on	quite	a	number	of	occasions.
As teaching became the core of my practice, its influence can be traced 
across a series of seminars that I have offered. These seminars covered 
topics that I had encountered in my research and that I felt could be of 
interest to developing designers. While the seminars have carried four 
titles over the years, they are not four distinct courses. Each offering of 
the course was an opportunity to incorporate the new and to purge that 
which was no longer of interest or consistent with my current understand-
ing. Within the history of each seminar, it became clear at some point 
that another title would be more appropriate. The sequence began with 
‘Technology Transfer’, followed by ‘Intelligent Environments’, ‘Human 
Environment Interaction’ and most recently ‘Sensory Culture’.
The Seminar in Technology Transfer that I offered at Columbia was an 
entirely pragmatic operation. In fact, it was developed to be an alterna-
tive to the vacuous philosophical banter of the design studios during the 
most embarrassing phases of Deconstructivism. It did not attempt to be 
an alternative by placing itself in opposition to it and thereby giving it 
recognition. Instead, I attempted to develop another axis that had on one 
hand, new materials, technologies and techniques and on the other, a 
range of disciplines such as artificial intelligence, cognitive science, arti-
ficial life, and complexity theory that I thought might offer new directions 
to Architecture as a discipline. But these new ideas were to be imported 
into architectural practice to infect what and how we built. Of course, 
it may change our understanding of architecture to a degree, but it was 
nonetheless targeted to a practice that concerned itself with the design of 
objects in the world.
The Seminar in Intelligent Environments was developed at the Univer-
sity of Arkansas. It had less to do with the hardware, though it retained 
the discussion of ‘smart materials’. Its focus was on robotic behavior and 
theories of intelligence in natural and artificial systems. The material that 
I was working with at that time is covered in papers such as Interfaces 
to Non-Symbolic Media3 and There is No Intelligence.4 Over time and 
with the NASA studio experiences the material began to shift its focus 
to the relationship of occupants to environments and at Rensselaer the 
seminar was renamed Human-Environment Interaction to reflect the new 
emphasis.
Seminar in Sensory Culture,5  the most recent in the sequence, examines 
perception and cognition from an embodied and situated perspective. Its 
purpose is to open the designers understanding of the ways that humans 
apprehend their environments. There is little in the seminar about materi-
als, techniques or technologies and so the evolution away from ‘Technol-
ogy Transfer’ is complete. In this course, I have refused to employ the five 
senses as organizing device or as topics of discussion, preferring what 
could be considered elements of these, for example discussing color but 
not vision, or other categories not related to five sense modalities such as 
perception before birth or after beheading. I make one goal of the seminar 
quite explicit at the outset; that I expect that the student’s understand-
ing and limitation of perception to sense modalities will not survive the 
seminar. In this, it is an elaboration of the attitude set forth in the paper 
Nonsense6 that takes as its premise the inadequacy of the decomposition 
of perception into sense modalities.
The course content parallels the shift in the subject matter of my design 
practice as set forth in the previous chapter. But the seminars not only 
reflect what happened in design, they play an active role in generating the 
3	 	Krueger	(2001)	Appendix	D	
4	 	Krueger	(2000)	Appendix	C	
5	 	The	syllabus	and	bibliography	is	in	Appendix	J
6	 	Krueger	(2006)	Appendix	G
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shift. The development of a seminar often requires that intuited relation-
ships between disciplines be made explicit in order that the students, who 
have little background in the variety of disciplines covered, can make 
the same connections that I have made. This activity strengthens my own 
understanding. These seminars, especially in recent years, have drawn 
students from cognitive and computer science, the humanities and the 
arts as well as architecture. This has made it necessary to engage in dis-
cussions with others having a range of backgrounds perspectives and dis-
ciplinary indoctrinations different than my own. In addition, the seminars 
provided their own motivation to acquire the knowledge required to fill 
out an interest or pattern, for its own sake. Much of the reading in Devel-
opmental Systems Theory was generated by references in other subjects. 
The shift from a pragmatic to an epistemic focus in my practice is not 
only due to the activities of teaching however. It follows from my experi-
ences with a series of experiments that produced what were for me quite 
unexpected results. 
A Surprise
Shortly after his arrival it became clear that my graduate student hadn’t 
the slightest idea which way was north, so that the idea of a compass 
belt began as a bit of humor on how we could help him get situated in a 
new city. I threatened to require him to wear the prosthetic until he could 
identify the cardinal points.7 We used a sensor intended to be part of an 
automotive navigation system. The belt contained eight small vibrating 
motors and a microcontroller that directed current to whatever motor was 
closest to north.
My first opportunity to test the compass belt coincided with the GRC in 
October 2002. The device was finished just prior to my flight and I had 
not had the opportunity to do field-testing. I decided that a visit to Ste-
larc’s exhibition at Monash University would be a particularly appropri-
ate trial. Unfortunately, this was just following the bombings in Bali in 
which many Australian tourists were killed. There was a heightened level 
of security in Melbourne, and the belt seemed a fashion accessory that 
was perhaps a bit too provocative to wear on mass transit. I kept it hidden 
under my shirt and jacket and did not turn it on until after I exited the train 
and was well away from the station. 
As I walked to the gallery, the device worked well. The vibrator that was 
to the north was consistently activated. Once into the exhibition, I was 
admittedly distracted. The device was active, I was getting acclimated to 
its presence, and ignored it to a great extent. But it came back into promi-
nence once I left the gallery and walked back to the train via another 
route. The device seemed much less reliable now and I was quite disap-
pointed. As I waited for the train back to Melbourne, I resolved to email 
my graduate student, who had been working on the device, with a de-
scription of its erratic activity. It was inconsistent even when I stood stock-
still! Sometimes it was relatively stable, but there were moments when it 
simply jumped around without apparent cause. I would suggest to him 
that it was unlikely that the earth’s magnetic field could do this; perhaps 
it was the sloppy way the device was constructed. To me, it seemed to be 
the likely result of an earth current loop, an electrical short, or loose wire. 
As I rode the train back into the city, the device’s behavior was bizarre. 
A swirling and pulsating field surrounded me. Its dynamics shifted with 
acceleration as we left a station and deceleration as we approached an-
7	 	 I	may	give	directions	 like	 ‘go	west	at	 the	next	 intersection’.	Mason,	my	grad	
student,	would	have	said	‘take	a	left’.	Global	vs.	egocentric	orientation	is	a	common	
difference	between	individuals.	I	have	trouble	knowing	left	from	right.	It	is	always	
changing.	Sometimes	west	is	left	and	sometimes	right.	It	seems	so	inconsistent.
other. Clearly, these were the result of my standing over the massive mo-
tor/generators that drove and stopped the train. I also then realized that 
the inconsistent behavior that concerned me at the station was due to my 
standing under the overhead power lines for the train. The device was 
responding to the fluctuations in the current drawn through the lines by 
distant trains that I could not see. The ‘bad behavior’ of the device was not 
due to its faulty construction, but to my faulty construction of what it was 
for and how it would work. I had devised an understanding and expec-
tations that would not be met and when the expectations failed looked 
first to faults in the device. Given my largely self-taught experiences with 
building electronics, I don’t think that the initial impulse to suspect the 
device was far off the mark. Those with experience building devices may 
agree. But, its important to recognize also that the surprise was not only 
generated by the fact that the device worked in an unanticipated way, but 
in how it reorganized my thoughts about the design objectives.
The experience of the dynamic fields was nothing like the ‘van Allen belt’ 
diagrams of electromagnetic fields that I had been exposed to in phys-
ics classes. I had been working with electricity and electronics for years 
and I thought that I understood a few things. Perhaps so, but it became 
clear that it is radically different to understand from a diagram and from 
experience. It was a good demonstration of the difference between ‘state’ 
and ‘process’. But most importantly, it was an opportunity to reflect upon 
design intent and actual operation. 
I knew what this device was for—I designed it.8 But it opened experience 
to an entirely different, and more interesting, range of phenomena. As it 
was being developed we thought about the device as something to make 
the ‘invisible visible’. In this, we succeeded beyond our expectations. 
However, the invisibility that it exposed was not only that of the electro-
magnetic field, but of a conceptual blind spot as well. If there are wicked 
problems, and wicked disciplines, as I suggested in the previous chapter, 
then surely there must also be wicked solutions – solutions that are not 
bound by the intent of the designer but interact with the context in which 
they are deployed in unexpected ways. Most responses to wicked prob-
lems are like this. With signal-processing techniques, I could attempt to 
redesign this device to filter-out the local dynamics and leave the global 
constants, but it seems far more interesting to let the results stand. The 
device does not reliably provide orientation within the magnetic field of 
the earth, because of this, it can have little pragmatic value as an orienting 
device. There still may be practical uses. I don’t know what they are and 
I’m not all that interested. Instead, I believe its greater value lies in how 
it illuminates and then modifies my understanding of magnetism and in 
the opportunity it provides for considering the unintended consequences 
of design activity.
Some years before, I had written on the possibility of applying design 
activity to biological matter. On the Design of Organisms9 is a paper 
skeptical of this possibility. I saw design activity as infused with human 
intention and biological activity completely devoid of intent. I believed 
that design activity, because it was directed, did not have the same ‘vis-
ibility’ into the space of potential solutions, as did the biological. Given 
that perspective, it seemed especially naïve to have designed an interface 
to allow access to magnetic phenomena without realizing that I would 
be caught by surprise by my own lack of visibility into the potential the 
device held.
8	 	This	statement	must	be	interpreted	as	implying	design	at	the	scale	of	resolu-
tion	referred	to	in	the	argument.	There	certainly	are	elements	that	were	collabora-
tively	determined	and	others,	where	Mason	Juday,	my	graduate	research	assistant,	
was	responsible	for	the	decisions	and	configuration.
9	 	Krueger	(2000)	Appendix	B
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And now, More Surprises
Experimentation with the acoustical properties of a steel plate has 
changed my understanding of the Material both in its properties and its 
behavior. Not only has this resulted in my realization that prior assump-
tions were unfounded and misinformed, but it has suggested that build-
ing knowledge may not be the proper objective in this case. The plates 
behave in ways that seem always to violate my expectations, to surprise 
me, to produce an understanding that understanding may not be possible. 
I approached this activity as neither scientist seeking to uncover the na-
ture of things nor as an artist seeking to produce or express anything 
of significance to the culture but as a designer whose interest is less in 
achieving the pragmatic or instrumental than finding the epistemic impli-
cations of the work.
Listening to the Inaudible
Infrasound, sound below the threshold of human hearing, was of some 
interest in developing a better understanding of the limits of perception. 
And so, I began to build a very large-scale subwoofer by attaching a voice 
coil-type tactile transducer to a variety of materials in a range of sizes and 
geometries and driving them through a distribution of frequencies. This 
‘build and test’ approach was used because there is very little information 
available about building speakers that cannot be heard. The range of hu-
man hearing is typically considered to be 20 to 20,000 cycles per second, 
why would you build a speaker that you could not hear? There would 
seem to be limited commercial value. 
This supposes that the perceivable is limited to the range given. But my 
experiences have shown me that this is far from the case. The infrasonic 
is not silent, but rather the frequencies below the range of hearing are 
simply perceivable by some, perhaps several, other means and the quali-
tative difference between those that can be heard and those that cannot is 
subtle. Evelyn Glennie, often considered one of the best solo percussion-
ists in the world, is deaf, but shows no inability in perceiving the playing 
of the musicians that accompany her. 
None of my efforts to build a monster subwoofer resulted in a success-
ful infrasonic speaker. Hot-rolled mill-finished steel plate suspended in a 
testing rig produced a wide range of frequencies many of which were in 
the audible range complicating and obscuring those that were not. The 
steel was completely inappropriate substrate for producing infrasound, 
but it sure sounded interesting.
The work in infrasound took another direction, building tuned chambers 
as Helmholtz resonators driven by a subwoofer. This was a much more 
successful approach and resulted in the practice of working in a room 
within the selected frequency for extended periods of time. Many claims 
have been made about the effects of infrasound from their development 
as military weapons to the, probably false, but alleged ability of certain 
frequencies to induce a loss of bowel control. The periods of extended 
listening were an attempt to become aware of some of the physiological, 
cognitive or emotional effects of infrasound that may not be initially ap-
parent. 
This manner of working was influenced to a large extent by my experi-
ence of the work of La Monte Young and Marian Zazeela as installed at 
the Dream House in New York.10 Young’s sound installation, The Base 
9:7:4 Symmetry in Prime Time When Centered above and below The 
Lowest Term Primes in The Range 288 to 224 with The Addition of 279 
and 261 in Which The Half of The Symmetric Division Mapped above and 
Including 288 Consists of The Powers of 2 Multiplied by The Primes within 
The Ranges of 144 to 128, 72 to 64 and 36 to 32 Which Are Symmetrical 
to Those Primes in Lowest Terms in The Half of The Symmetric Division 
Mapped below and Including 224 within The Ranges 126 to 112, 63 to 
56 and 31.5 to 28 with The Addition of 119, is a single, albeit extremely 
complex tone that has been played continuously for almost twenty years. 
I have experienced this work on numerous occasions in sessions that have 
lasted up to four and a half hours. I have written about this experience in 
a paper called This is Not Entertainment.11 In addition, I have learned a 
great deal from my colleague Pauline Oliveros and her practice of “Deep 
Listening”. I had on several occasions attempted to audit her course on 
Deep Listening, but my administrative duties kept me from regular atten-
dance. Still, I experienced enough to come away with a deep respect for 
this composer’s practice and to understand that the focused and sustained 
attention directed at sound could open possibilities I had not imagined. 
My experiences with extended listening did not always remain acute and 
focused but varied from the intense and directed to benign neglect and 
complete boredom.
The strategy of extended listening was also used in the experiments on 
steel plates that I was undertaking simultaneously. I applied a selected 
frequency at constant amplitude to the plates for runs lasting up to nine 
hours. In contrast to the uniformity and predictability of the resonators, 
strange and unexpected things happened to the plates. I had a simple 
steel plate with simple perturbations and from it I expected a simple re-
sult. I was educated about vibrational modes using illustrations of the 
classic Chladni patterns and expect vibration to be coherent, predictable, 
and beautiful. This was not to be.
The physical setup for these experiments consists of a stand made of two 
fiberboard open boxes separated by slotted steel angle posts. The steel 
plate was suspended from the upper box by a variety of methods, typi-
cally a chain of steel hooks running from an eyebolt in the upper box to a 
drilled hole in the plate. Neoprene tie-down straps such as those that hold 
tarpaulins in place on trailers, bent threaded rods, or recently, much more 
elaborate offset and counterbalanced methods have also been employed. 
The signal is supplied by a frequency generator, amplifier and associated 
power supply located in an adjacent steel-shelving unit.
Phases
The first novel behavior I noticed was the development of a sequence of 
distinct and increasingly energetic phases proceeding from a barely au-
dible hum to the convulsive shaking of sound-effects thunder. The plate 
contains a broad spectrum of frequencies that cancel and reinforce in 
complex ways. My sense was that there was a capacitance for frequen-
cies within the plate, some kind of storage mechanism that would build 
up enough energy in some certain frequency to shift the plate into a new 
vibrational mode.These transitions can be visually identified on the am-
plitude plot at the left. 1:50, 3:35, 5:08, and 5:43 and can be heard in the 
recording made of my exhibition and presentation that forms part of the 
digital record of the PhD work.
10		 I	 first	 encountered	 this	amazing	 installation	at	 the	 suggestion	of	 and	 in	 the	
company	of	Ranulph	Glanville	who	had	been	familiar	with	the	work	for	a	period	of	
years
11		Krueger(2008)	Appendix	I
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The first phase is the quietest with a gradual increase in amplitude, the 
tone is steady and at this point one is tempted to say that little is happen-
ing. That begins to shift in the next phase when the amplitude generally 
increases and there is a distinct pulsing, although the amplitude decreas-
es and the pulses stretch just before the third phase begins. The third pro-
ceeds in a series of crescendo hums that last about three seconds. They 
are initially distinct and cohesive but begin to fracture into sets of shorter 
pulses. These shorter pulses cohere into a driving rhythmic structure in 
the fourth phase that erupts in the fifth into energetic and chaotic activity.
If I examine the first phase, in which little appears to happen, I can detect 
an increase in a higher frequency just before the phase ends. I can hear 
this by listening in close succession to two segments separated in the orig-
inal recording by several seconds. Other changes can be found through 
a similar process of inspection or comparison, but for me, this additional 
examination has yielded only a more fine-grained level of description. 
This descriptive activity can be continued, perhaps infinitely, but there 
is no implication of causality in any of the shifts that I have observed. I 
had what I thought was a very simple condition a suspended steel plate 
perturbed by a simple and stable frequency at constant amplitude, but the 
results varied greatly. The apparent organization or structure of its behav-
ior at a variety of scales surprised me.
Anti-sound
I have a rather limited budget for my research activity and have obtained 
equipment from online auctions, yard sales, and discount houses. From 
time-to-time some of the equipment that I’ve used has stopped function-
ing—these things happen. When the sound of a vibrating plate that I’d 
listened to for a long time suddenly stopped, I assumed that I’d ‘burned-
up’ yet another amplifier and went over to turn off the apparatus. But I 
was surprised first to discover that the equipment continued to function, 
and then to see that the plate continue to move, but now to emit (almost) 
silence instead. The plate produced its own anti-sound, perhaps.
An example of this can be heard on the examination video and can be 
seen in the amplitude plot on the right. While certainly surprising the 
first time it occurred, it was not a rare event. It seems odd in retrospect 
that while I had become accustomed to the idea that a variety of different 
sounds could result from a simple input to a suspended plate, I hadn’t 
considered that ‘no sound’ could be one of the options. Typically, the 
sound returned spontaneously after several seconds.
Residual Effects
One evening, I had listened to a long sequence of phases that culminated 
in one that was loud, chaotic and apparently long-lived. I thought it less 
interesting than the sequence that preceded it. These had been varied 
with a fascinating polyrhythm. I decided to make a recording of the se-
quence produced by that particular frequency and amplitude combina-
tion before moving on to explore the behaviors at others. I turned off the 
apparatus, damped the plate and the support frame, and after configur-
ing the microphones and software, I began again. But the behavior of 
the plate did not begin again, instead, it continued from its most recent 
phase—loud, chaotic and apparently stable. It was as if it remembered 
where it had been and picked up about where it left off.  I demonstrate 
this during my presentation as well. There is a very short startup phase 
before settling into to a structure that is remarkably similar to what was 
evident before damping the plate.
There is some residue. Some may consider it a form of memory physically 
instantiated within the material, at least for a time it seems. I prefer to 
avoid the term because for me it brings with it a great deal of cultural bag-
gage and it is difficult to know if this will be helpful.12 But, the presence 
of this residual disposition makes me wonder if there is any initial start 
that I can consider to be an ‘uncontaminated’ origin. If the plate is vibrat-
ing at a certain frequency and another is introduced, the two frequencies 
interact and through reinforcement and cancellation produce a whole 
new range of effects.  I have had the sense that when the plate is hanging 
quietly and I turn on the amplifier and frequency generator that I am start-
ing anew. But if the plate has been vibrating vigorously and recently, as in 
the example above, this is clearly not the case. When I begin again with 
a new frequency are the results that I obtain due to the frequency and 
time that I used on the plate the day before? Perhaps my activities over 
the course of several years with this plate have long-term residual effects. 
I assume that the steel plate is the same as when I first started, but the 
residual effect calls this assumption into question. Is this residual effect 
restricted to the domain of steel plates vibrating in basement workshops, 
or is it of wider applicability? In other domains, I am completely comfort-
able with the properties of metals retaining effects from their history. The 
blade of a knife can be tempered and the edge hardened in the course of 
its making; a shape memory alloy’s shape can be recorded and erased, 
also, with temperature; distorting a metal may cause work hardening and 
accompanying brittleness. Perhaps there is never starting anew, no tabula 
rasa. We are always entirely enmeshed in residual effects. There may only 
be residual effects.
Space
It was about the same time as I was discovering these strange behaviors 
that I noticed another. While not all frequencies result in interesting be-
havior, I had also learned that some just take a long time to develop. I 
may be entertained or I may be bored. It’s not easy to predict when a shift 
in behavior is about to occur. The plate hangs in the middle of the room 
and next to it sits a massive steel welder’s table where I often work while 
the plate vibrates in the background. Frequently after a long passage of 
identical behavior, I noticed that the sound of the plate would change 
exactly when I was about to leave the room. Furthermore, if I returned 
to the worktable, it would return to its old routine. Convinced that its 
behavior had stabilized once again, I would head for the door, and again 
the sound would shift just as I got to it. If I remained at the table, I noticed 
that this did not occur when others left the room and so, the explanation 
became clear. The small vestibule-like space formed by a shelving unit 
had unique acoustic properties and I was mistaking my change in posi-
tion for a change in the plate.
My workspace in the basement of the Greene Building was once a class-
room. I often use the space for seminars if the class size is small. It has 
windows spaced high in the walls looking out at ground level. It has 
steam heat and maple floors. Both my graduate students and seminar par-
ticipants complained of a moldy smell from time to time—some said that 
it made them ill. At my request, the university’s maintenance personnel 
came on several occasions with their sophisticated air quality sampling 
gear to check on the source of the complaints, but assured me that there 
was nothing amiss. Then one day the floors buckled severely due to the 
continued leaking in the steam pipes that ran below the floors. This re-
quired the complete removal of the contents of the room and the replace-
ment of the floor with concrete. The moldy smell has disappeared. Gone 
too are many of the complex behaviors that I had recorded earlier.
12		It	may	indeed	be	that	this	phenomenon	is	like	memory.	Or,	it	may	be	that	mem-
ory	is	like	this	phenomena.	But,	these	are	not	necessarily	equivalent	statements.
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It is far from certain what aspects or conditions of the prior configuration 
may have played a role. The lower fiberboard box on which the appa-
ratus rested may have coupled to the wooden floor creating below the 
floor a resonant chamber much like the body of a musical instrument. 
The scale of that chamber isn’t known. The steam pipes run in a crawl 
space beneath the entire building and continue on to others; perhaps it 
was only the reflection of the sound from the floor back onto the plate 
that influenced the behavior, or the occupant’s movements on the floor 
itself. Maybe the new effect is not due to what the floor did, but what the 
concrete does.
The change in behavior may not have to do with the floor. I was traveling 
when the floor was replaced and could not supervise the removal of the 
contents of my workspace. A signal generator was damaged in the interim 
and while replaced with a similar device, the new one operates on tran-
sistors and the old on vacuum tubes (valves). I may not have reassembled 
the set-up in quite the same way; I was not able to photograph the appa-
ratus before it was taken apart. Perhaps the hanging mechanisms are not 
isolating but couple in specific ways that in part determine the behavior 
of the system. There are as many explanations for the change as there are 
hypotheses about how the system might operate. But what can be learned 
from this sequence of events is not more detail about the operation of the 
system, but a new understanding of its scope. The system could not be 
circumscribed as closely as I had previously thought. It certainly is not 
a simple suspended plate with a simple perturbation. Its interest and its 
behavior come from its connectedness.
In A Progress Note on Research into a Cybernetic Analogue of Fabric,13 
Stafford Beer, a cybernetician of management, reviews an astonishing 
series of investigations into control mechanisms for highly dimensional 
complex systems. He was doubtful that computational techniques could 
be crafted that would contain the requisite variety14, so rather than de-
signing a control system he attempted to take an existing self-organized 
system of high variety and constrain it. He worked on what he called 
‘fungoid’ or chemical systems inspired by Paskian colloidal cells15. He 
devised a game to be played by children to solve simultaneous linear 
equations (that was, remarkably, successful), a physical network occupied 
by pigeons or rats and he considered the activity of social insects. He ex-
perimented with fresh-water crustaceans by inducing them to ingest iron 
filings and then subjected them to environmental variables transduced 
into electromagnetic fields. He worked with populations of protozoa and 
eventually the ecology of a pond. 
While his work with these systems was typically not successful, his ob-
servations of his own experiences as an experimenter are of interest here. 
He notes16:
Our scientific training, modified as it may be by years of experience in 
cybernetics, pushes us always towards attempts at analysis. I tell my-
self repeatedly that this thing is a black box in whose transfer functions 
I am not interested. Yet I repeatedly try to isolate experimental effects 
(…). I do not want to do this, but I do it. The reason is, of course, that 
although one can see experimental techniques for handling the total 
system and measuring its behavior, the results defy the kinds of inter-
pretation at our disposal.
13		Beer(1994)
14		Ashby	(1958),		p. 202-216 
15		Pask
16		Beer	(1994)
Similarly, considering the exotic behavior exhibited by the vibration of the 
plate it is tempting to attempt explanations. Models come to mind. When 
the plate shifts from one mode of response to another, I am reminded of 
the basins of attraction from the mathematics of chaos. Perhaps some shift 
at the molecular level accounts for the memory effect, something akin 
to a change in temperature. Can a build-up and transfer of energy from 
the plate to the environment and back be accounted for by the theory of 
coupled oscillators? Each of these might be investigated further, however, 
it might also be that the value of these behaviors lies not in the ‘finger’ of 
physics but what it is ‘pointing at’ in epistemology.  
If I frame the consideration of the plate in terms of an input to a physical 
system and its consequently surprising behavior, I look for explanations 
of the behavior within the realm of physics. But If I choose the frame 
differently, I consider the system to be a black box to which the input is 
frequency, amplitude and expectation and the output is surprise. Now in 
that case, I would look to the understanding that I bring to the situation 
and the understanding that I take away.
The activity of the plates opened up a several insights for me. One is the 
way in which the temporal framing of an investigation circumscribes what 
will be found. I began recording the plate one morning, but was called 
away unexpectedly. This frequency/amplitude pair did not result in the 
phasing sequence that is seen in the other recordings noted here. It was 
recorded after the change of floor and its behavior is more typical of what 
occurs now. In this case, the activity was most vigorous at the beginning, 
but after a time the plate settled down into a steady hum. It is as if it takes 
a while for all parts of the plate to become organized to vibrate in uni-
son, that the plate sheds its complex modes of vibration and falls into a 
behavioral basin of attraction. Sometimes this happens, and when it does, 
my experience has been that it doesn’t change. If I had been in the room 
I would have turned it off long ago, but on that day I could not return 
for nine hours. What can be seen on the amplitude plot is that the plate 
gradually settles down to a steady state after 1:39:38. Nothing happens 
for five hours. Then, at 6:40:34 the behavior changes. 
This spontaneous action is not unique. Richard Brown’s Electrochemical 
Glass of 1998 is an experiment trapping between glass plates galvanically 
active metals within an electrolyte. Eight years after it was constructed a 
new and dramatic dendritic growth appeared over several months.17 
Things happen in their own time, and our temporal framing may preclude 
our experiencing them and thereby circumscribe our understanding. It 
may be that many things are not apprehended because there is too little 
cultural value placed on patience. Even with all my experiences with the 
plate, in fact because of them, I would have turned this recording off to 
look for more ‘interesting’ things.
The second thing I learned has directly to do with ‘interesting’ things. I 
liked the surprises, the interesting and unexpected behavior and the way 
that it illuminated errors or inadequacies in my tacit understandings. I 
have come to appreciate the way in which these occurrences seemed 
to open up possibilities where before there had been standard answers. 
Perhaps this is simply extending Ranulph Glanville’s notion of generosity 
to the world at large, to what we take to be material substance. It may 
be that the historical drive of western science, not as it is in the doing so 
much as how that back propagates through the culture, has been con-
cerned with organizing and conquering the chaos, with hammering it 
into the frameworks that we know as understanding. We can explain this. 
Or, we can listen to it. Perhaps there’s more it can say.
17		Glanville	and	Muller,	p.30
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The desire for surprise shifts the objective of the work towards developing 
situations in which new understandings could arise. The activity of design 
becomes an effort to put into place processes from which new realiza-
tions can occur and from which surprises can be expected. 
When I teach research methods to graduate students in the Architectural 
Sciences.18 I often ask them to graph the results of their research before 
they have undertaken it. Most experiments are designed to confirm some-
thing that is already understood or at least intuited.  To suggest that they 
already know, could or should know often challenges their understand-
ing of the experimental method. They often think that they will discover 
something, rather than seek evidence that their intuition is a possibility. 
Much work in the Sciences is like this.19. Despite this, the research that 
I undertake now does not grow out of an intuition about the answer but 
an intuition that I can undertake activities in such a way as to raise ques-
tions. Perhaps this is what links it to design thinking. Design is more often 
involved in question than answer finding, perhaps for some, more con-
cerned with listening than speaking.
An Appetite for the Unexpected
Leon van Schaik introduced the thought that ‘surprise’ was a recurring 
element common in my work while reviewing the Vibration Studies. 
Since then I find that it is indeed fundamental. In Mosquitoes, Ken Kaplan 
characterized our collaborative work as “ball-bearings-in-the-creamed-
spinach research”. The iterative circulation of drafts of the text makes it 
difficult to definitively attribute an element to one of the other of us and 
is generally unimportant, but that one was definitely Kaplan because I 
can still remember the delight I had on first reading it—it was perfect! 
The collaboration was known as K/K Research and Development and was 
meant to suggest garage-based inventors, rather than a university20 or cor-
porate laboratory. Further, we did not want to convey an emulation of 
those models, but to situate outside them and outside NY design culture 
of its day21 as crackpot inventers in a skunk-works. The phrase conveys 
something of our method and results; the non-sequitor of metal on teeth 
within the vegetables and the sense that this is just somebody’s idea of a 
bad joke.
But these more recent surprises are different, because in the present 
framework they have become vehicles for reflection on assumptions; the 
18		I	direct	the	MS/PhD	program	in	the	Architectural	Sciences	at	Rensselaer	Poly-
technic	Institute’s	School	of	Architecture.	This	program	supports	research	in	the	
areas	of	Lighting,	Architectural	Acoustics,	Built	Ecologies,	and,	until	recently,	Infor-
matics	and	Architecture.
19		Glanville(1999)
20		The	current	fashion	in	US	architecture	schools	designates	everything	as	a	labo-
ratory.	Starting	with	Computer	Labs,	now	Computation,	Simulation	or	Visualiza-
tion	Laboratories	and	the	shop	has	become	Fabrication	Laboratory	(the	FabLab,	
typically),	and	so	on.	Perhaps	working	in	a	polytechnic	foregrounds	my	concern	
that	our	desire	to	become	junior	techno-scientists	in	these	contexts	obscures	what	
should	be	instead	a	growing	confidence	that	design	thinking	has	an	important	and	
unique	contribution	to	make.	Design	should	not	be	accommodated	within	the	aca-
demic	context	but	be	appreciated	as	a	discipline	that	can	be	learned	from.	Wan-
nabe	science	was	not	what	the	‘Research	and	Development‘	was	about.	
21		For	example,	in	a	panel	discussion	hosted	at	the	Storefront	for	Art	and	Archi-
tecture	in	New	York	with	Wes	Jones	and	Neil	Denari,	we	understood	that	some	of	
the	presenters	would	be	rather	intent	to	publically	establish	their discourse.	Our	
response	was	for	Kaplan	to	arrive	in	lab	coat	and	welder’s	goggles	and	I	in	slightly	
greasy	mechanics	coveralls	carrying	a	spade	bearing	 the	phrase	“Clean	up	after	
your	dogma”.	So	there	were	some	aspects	of	this	presentation	as	a	performance	
and	those	were	targeted	at	conveying	a	certain	positioning	in	relation	to	what	we	
considered	to	be	both	the	fashionable	and	orthodox	theoretical	posturing	of	the	
traditional	avant-guard.
catalyst for the design of new ways of framing experience and thereby to 
open onto new experiences. The understanding that there is a structural 
coupling between surprise and framework makes surprise the genera-
tor of surprise—though perhaps not immediately. In addition, there is a 
growing intuition that I can put myself in the way of surprises rather than 
simply recognizing them when the show up unexpectedly. It may be that 
I can craft situations in which surprise is a likely result; perhaps I can 
expect surprises. 
I have begun a group of experiments in which this is a possibility. The 
concept of peri-personal space is becoming important in studies of em-
bodied cognition and perception. It is the space surrounding a person 
in which they can operate, typically the space within reach.21 It may be 
mapped neurologically in a different way than the rest of the volume in 
which one exists. 22. I think that it could be as aspect of the ‘personal 
space’ of Edward Hall23 and others that was part of environmental psy-
chology of the 1970s, but is distinct from it in that it is less social and 
interpersonal, and more operational, in its definition. Clearly, the ability 
to operate within a volume may be sensed by both parties in an interper-
sonal situation, perhaps through such mechanisms as mirror-neurons,24 
although it may also be accounted for by common sense. 25 This may play 
into social practices and the sense of space that is accorded to an indi-
vidual in particular cultures.
Much of the discussion of peri-personal space comes out of neuroscience 
and psychology, although there is interest in its applications by design-
ers. My sense is that a designer investigating the same phenomena would 
bring to it different interests and methods and so may come to understand 
it in a different way. This not only has a higher probability of being of use 
to designers, but may feedback into the concept in important ways, illu-
minating it with insights that are not available through different methods 
if inquiry.
My initial impulse in this investigation was to try to represent the peri-
personal space. I believe that no one has seen it. This is perhaps not a 
particularly surprising or creative approach for an architect. But, I had 
only seen ‘arrows-in-plan’ diagrams that illustrated the concept of peri-
personal space. I have, over the course of my life, moved my arms around 
a significant amount and I knew that this volume would be complex and 
probably visually interesting. What I didn’t yet know was that I had vastly 
different amounts of experience within that space, some parts of it would 
surprise me. The process that I used was to gain access to a motion cap-
ture lab, collect the data, construct a point cloud and then surface that to 
create a representation of the volume26. I built a jig to ensure that my right 
arm pivoted from the same point each time and then proceeded to cap-
ture the maximum volume swept by it. You can almost ‘see’ this yourself if 
you take a moments effort to sweep out that volume in your imagination. 
While the motion capture scheme sounded feasible and straightforward, 
it was not. The point cloud described a surface within some tolerance 
but not one that could be surfaced and reflect the nature of the space. It 
registered within the surface all the variations of posture, fatigue and the 
small contingent errors of data collection. In order to get to the smooth-
ness of the space that we understood from our experience we had to 
22		Gallese	(2005a)
23		Hall	(1966)
24		Gallese	(2005b)
25		a	most	exemplary	explanatory	principal.	What	I	intend	here	is	that	self-knowl-
edge	is	easily	extrapolated	to	another	similar	being	without	recourse	to	special-
ized	neurological	structures.
26		 I	was	 fortunate	 to	have	 the	assistance	of	 Joseph	Choma	whose	digital	 skills	
enabled	the	project	even	as	it	challenged	them.
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leave the data behind. Using it for scale, position and inspiration, and 
then supplementing it with a series of photographic studies, the volume 
was designed. My objective is to describe this volume, and the data were 
getting in the way.  The data driven volume and the invented volume are 
approximations. Each registers certain aspects of the history of its mak-
ing. In this case, the invented volume captures aspects of the space that 
interest me. The data derived model captures aspects of the process that 
do not interest me in this context. Yes, it is bad science, but, as a designer, 
I don’t have to handle the same set of questions as a scientist. My objec-
tives are different.
The swept volume was scaled and positioned on a digital human that was 
my size, though with better posture and less paunch. This allowed us to 
see the volume in relation to a body. One thing that became immediately 
apparent was the big hole in the model just behind the shoulder. In fact, 
my mental model didn’t include much volume back there and captured 
none of its complexity. In my mental model, I could see the shape of the 
volume in front of me much more clearly. And of course that is informed 
by my history of seeing it all my life. The interaction of visual and haptic 
space began to interest me as well. 
I realized that there were qualitative differences within the volume of the 
peri-personal. More likely, I expect, portions of this space had not been 
considered or visualized by other researchers. It seemed to me that the 
space of operation may well consist of not only reaching, but also of visu-
ally guided activity. What is the shape of the volume that is the intersec-
tion of reach and vision? My first step in answering this question was to 
determine my ‘cone of vision’.
Just as the volume within which I can reach will be unique to me because 
of the specific lengths of each bone and the degree of flexibility of each 
joint, my cone of vision will also be unique because one side if it is deter-
mined by the physical structure of my face. So, I devised a way to record 
the extent of my visual field on a panel placed in front of me by using 
a very long and narrow u-shaped device. One ‘tine’ had an illuminated 
diode attached to its end and was on the subjects side of the panel, the 
other of the same length was used to mark the position on the back side of 
the panel. My research assistant moved the light and marked the position 
when I acknowledged that the light could be seen.
When I set up the panel and began testing, I realized that when looking 
straight ahead, I could perceive almost 90 degrees to the side. The panel 
would have to be of infinite length if it were to be flat. The apparatus was 
rebuilt to wrap around to the side and allow that extent of lateral vision to 
be recorded. The device had a dental guard from a piece of sports equip-
ment that I bit down on, locating and stabilizing my head, and a dot in 
front of me that I focused on during a trial in an effort to keep my cone of 
vision stabilized in space so it could be measured.
The recording of my cone of vision had many difficulties. The simple task 
of sliding the light inward at a random location did not yield a smooth 
curve expected. Repeating the task in the same location often yielded a 
range rather than a singular reliable result. The understanding that un-
folded over the course of these experiments was that there is not the cone 
of vision that I was searching for but rather a series of nested cones of dif-
ferent capabilities; zones in which the presence of light is sensed, zones 
in which motion is detected, where color is detected and then where the 
detail is apprehended. What I understood to be seeing is principally fovial 
vision, but the eye has many capabilities that are integrated from these 
cones within cones. When I return to these studies, I will need to extend 
them with a better sense of what vision and reaching have to do with each 
other and what perceptual and motor capabilities I will combine to create 
a spatial model of peri-personal space.
Throughout the course of my studies of perception I have read extensively 
about vision. In the western tradition, seeing is the dominant perceptual 
mode, a cultural bias. While I know that different portions of the eye 
have different capabilities, my understanding of them as nested cones of 
visual capabilities rather than a singular thing comes out of these failed 
experiments. Further, the role of these cones in the enactive model vision, 
known as sensori-motor contingency theory, has not been explored as yet, 
to the best of my knowledge. Accounts of vision that are skill-based are 
actually accounts of fovial vision only. So there may be ways in which this 
designer’s intuition can inform other approaches to the same phenomena.
Designing the conditions from which surprise happens is a further step in 
the epistemic dimension of the practice. The lesson and intrigue of this 
kind of research is that much of what I think I know is probably wrong. 
If I stop here, I stand with Popper. Science will understand its method in 
particular ways—but what does a designer do with this realization? In the 
next chapter, I consider elements of my practice that have remained in 
place for long periods of time. In the fifth chapter, I attempt to set forth the 
implications of the lack of confidence in knowledge that I hold. How can 
surprise and the seeking of surprise has suggests to me about a positive 
approach to moving forward as a designer. 
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we never got to use the hydra, it illustrates one of the roles played by 
found objects.  They gave us access to things that we could never think 
of ourselves, but things into which we could imagine.  They provided the 
alphabet for a new formal language that allowed us to get beyond what 
architecture was supposed to be. 
The process was still similar to what we had been taught to do in school. 
Rather than raiding Avery Library’s morgue of history, however, we were 
ripping pages out of the back of engineering manuals.  While I have con-
tinued to adapt and freely interpret the uses of things in my environment, 
as the formal agenda of the work is less emphasized, so too has a reliance 
on the formal aspects of the found.
Another approach to the found object is to purchase components that 
have been developed for one purpose and use them for another.  The 
installation at the Katonah Museum used 24 carbon fiber-epoxy com-
posite rods that were bent by the shape memory alloy wires.  These were 
intended to be fishing rods, but each contained some flaw that made 
them unacceptable for their intended use and therefore economical for 
mine.  In fact, they were components made with precision from advanced 
materials.  They were made much better than I could make them myself. 
While I would not know how to specify what I wanted so that it could be 
made for me, I can easily recognize these rods could be made to suit my 
purposes.  But also, my purposes could be made to suit the presence and 
availability of a quantity of these rods.  This is related to the strategies used 
by Tetris players as noted by Kirsh and Maglio.2  It is cognitively economi-
cal to use the ability to recognize the possibility within something rather 
than to invent those possibilities oneself.
The installation at Art Park contained 14 automotive radio power anten-
nae.  Their purpose was to give the impression of a sensing or probing or 
perhaps the deployment of defensive spines, but of course, the object did 
not contain 14 radios.3  The approach that we used in this case was to 
purchase the engineering services needed for the reliable operation of the 
work by purchasing the product in which that knowledge was embedded. 
Because the project was intended to remain in place for three months, 
suspended 10 meters above the path and 650 kilometers from its creators, 
reliability was very important.  Automotive products are engineered to 
survive conditions more difficult that this.  Therefore, the project was de-
signed around their use.  It operated internally on 12VDC although it was 
powered from the electric mains.
There have been other and more recent adaptations of technologies.  The 
electromagnetic glove experiments used circuitry removed from a device 
that was intended to amplify the output of telephone handset speakers as 
an aid for the heard of hearing.  In this case the sensor in the device was 
exchanged for another that operated on a similar principle and the output 
of the circuit drove a tactor rather than a speaker.  The significant amount 
of time saved by not having to design, build, test and debug a custom 
circuit was possible by understanding the fundamental similarity in the 
function of the found circuit and the function of the desired circuit.
This strategy of repurposing fits well with the use of computer control 
in many of the works.  They are, by design, machines that are open to 
a range of uses. The implementation of software opens the door to this 
enormous flexibility.  There is a distinction, of course, between this kind 
of repurposing and what I do with found hardware.  One had the flex-
ibility designed into it and the other it must be brought to it as a matter of 
the attitude with which the object is approached.
2	 	Kirsh	and	Maglio	(1994)
3	 	Perhaps	a	lost	opportunity.
Chapter Four
Continuities
In chapter three, I began by considering a process view of design practice 
and considered changes in the subject matter of my design practice; it 
looked at transitions in the things that I designed.  The following chapter 
considered transformations in the design objectives of my practice; it con-
sidered transformations in the reasons I design.  I used the standing wave 
as an illustration noting that something that can be identified might be the 
continuously created resultant of dynamic processes.  Having considered 
the dynamics, I consider now those elements of my practice that have 
remained stable across these changes.  What elements form the thing that 
I identify as cohesive and enduring when I refer to my practice?  Here, I 
will consider two: the continual interest in sensing and responsiveness, 
the consistent use of found objects. At the end of the chapter, I note how 
these interests are related, and see in this realization a relationship to my 
interdisciplinary disposition. 
Things found
Many of the built projects have made use of ‘found objects’; certainly 
much of the early kinetic and computer controlled sculptural pieces that 
resulted from the collaboration with Ken Kaplan were of this nature.  In 
these projects the elements were often actually found on the streets, in 
the alleys or dumpsters and accumulated by happenstance.  However, 
in the case of technical components, there were certain things that were 
understood as ‘valuable’ and ‘interesting’, especially components that 
enabled the machine elements to move and be positioned.  It would be 
more accurate to consider these as sought, at least as general compo-
nent types.  The most immediate justification would be economic.  The 
precision components that were pulled out of the dumpster would have 
been extremely expensive in prototyping quantities, and in addition, they 
would have been difficult to source.  These components then, enabled a 
range of possibilities that would not otherwise been available to us.  But 
there are, of course, additional reasons to use found objects.
Other elements were accumulated on the basis of a chance encounter: 
they were indeed found objects.  Selection of these elements was driven 
by intuition, portability and whether it was a good moment to collect. 
Selection was sometimes due to quantity.  One-of-something might not 
be interesting, but five of them held other possibilities.  Our workspace 
contained a (ridiculous) quantity of material that moved in and out of 
relationship to other pieces of junk in a highly conversational process of 
creating work.  The material properties and configuration of components 
were active participants in this conversation.
Kaplan or I had collected a very large wiring harness from a primitive 
mainframe.  It was the size of a person with tangles of telephone wires1 
bundled into ropes the thickness of a forearm.  These bundles went in ev-
ery direction, each ending in a large cast aluminum connector.  It looked 
organic and evoked the nervous system or a circulatory diagram.  It was 
a beautiful thing, bewildering in its complexity.  Often when the develop-
ment of a project seemed to stall, one of us would pull this thing off the 
wall where it hung for several years and slap it onto the project in order 
to shock us into a new direction.  It never failed to completely alter the 
visual properties of the piece, but it was so powerful that nothing that 
we had made could accept it.  It became a standing joke; if things were 
getting slow the project would get ‘a visitation from the hydra’.  While 
1	 	What	 I’m	referring	 to	as	 telephone	wires	were	about	 .5mm	in	diameter	(24	
AWG)	and	insulated	in	‘25-pair	color	code’	sheaths.
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tice I draw in my environment for resources that can be disposed in the 
service of the design.  The sensibility is much closer to collage than to the 
gesamtkunstwerk that is often a tacit assumption.  For me, much already 
exists and its presence charges the field of possibility with potential.  The 
task is to draw an existing element into a new pattern or configuration that 
is appropriate to my understanding of the situation.
The examples used earlier in the chapter focused on objects and their 
incorporation.  As my practice has shifted to teaching, the material from 
which I work has shifted from physical substance to ideas and concepts. 
Scanning the bibliography of this document, it will be clear that the 
sources are not random but patterned.  It may also be evident that they 
are drawn from a range of perspectives.  The patterns have to with subject 
matter; perception, cognition, embodiment, plasticity and adaptation of 
humans, and so on; and that the disciplines that inform each subject vary 
widely; the arts, design, philosophy, cognitive and neuroscience, and so 
on.  This is consistent with a view that disciplines are principally artifacts 
of our institutions and cultural practices.  The issues that compel our at-
tention rarely respect disciplinary bounds and many different perspec-
tives can inform an understanding of them.  It is arrogant, in my view, to 
proceed as if one’s perspective or discipline will solve the problem, or 
further, is the one that understands it. 
This perspective is informed to some extent by experiences in teaching. 
I was asked some years ago to offer a design studio to professional ar-
chitecture students that would consider the design of crew restraints for 
the International Space Station.  Crewmembers in the Space Station have 
difficulty performing certain tasks because they do not have gravity to 
hold them in place while they work; one is as likely to push away from 
the work as one is to ‘push the button’.  The crew has developed a range 
of ad hoc techniques to get the work done, but the kinds of research be-
ing undertaken was shifting to experiments that took hours to perform, 
resulting in stresses, fatigue and discomfort.  This, like the other similar 
microgravity design studios I have offered, was done with the Habitabil-
ity and Human Factors Group at the Johnson Space Center.  But in this 
case, they also invited six other universities to solve the same problem 
at the same time.  We were the architects, another school, the industrial 
psychologists, product designers, mechanical engineers and so on; each 
school, a different discipline.
When we presented our schematic designs I had an opportunity to talk 
with my colleagues at NASA about the overall progress of the project 
from their perspective.  My studio was unique in several ways.  We built 
a full-scale mock-up of a piece of the space station so that we could ex-
perience the space and understand our designs within it.  We did not ap-
proach the device design as a team, but had each student solve the prob-
lem individually.  The sponsors were delighted by the range and creativity 
of ideas we produced, which was far greater than the other disciplines. 
Unfortunately, many of these ideas were very schematic and some did 
not yet conform to the laws of physics and so had questionable futures. 
Typical architects.  The mechanical engineers, on the other hand, had de-
veloped an elaborate and ingenious mechanism, they had calculated the 
forces, and machined an impressive prototype, but, they didn’t yet know 
how or if it could be interfaced to a body.  The Industrial Psychologists 
had submitted an extensive document analyzing the problem.  It was the 
best statement of the issues involved that anyone had seen.  In fact, it was 
better than anything that was available at NASA.  But they had not yet 
started to consider what might constitute a solution.
Each discipline proceeded in a characteristic manner but our approaches, 
temporal rhythms, and values were disparate.  I expect, too, that these ap-
proaches yielded varied results.  Each must have appeared foolish to the 
The same strategy can be seen in the design of a light fixture that I fabri-
cated for my dining room.  In this case, I used four cast aluminum grain 
scoops purchased from a restaurant equipment supplier and a piece of 
square steel tube from a surplus metals dealer.  The wiring came from 
hanging lamp that was truly dreadful in design.  I chose it not only be-
cause it provided the requisite parts but also for the small pleasure de-
rived from depriving the world of its presence.  These elements, with 
some modifications, were simply combined with appropriate socket and 
bulb types to create the lamp.  Behind it on the chimney can be seen an 
English saddle hung bottom-side out.  The house also contains a kitchen 
furnished with cabinets that were once the science laboratory at Central 
Catholic High School, an industrial cart that serves as a coffee table and 
so on in a standard objet trouvé manner.  These examples are provided in 
order to indicate that this way of working is rather pervasive in whatever 
I make.
Sensing and Responding
The historical trajectory of sensing and responsiveness in the work has 
already been covered in Chapters Two and Three.  This interest is long-
standing, beginning with a desire to make kinetic objects and transform-
ing into a desire to extend the human sensorium.  The interest predates 
these projects; perhaps undergraduate courses in perception and behav-
ior are early expressions of this interest.  One of the projects in my portfo-
lio to gain entry to architecture school, a very early design effort, was for a 
sculpture in a downtown plaza in Chicago that I made in 1979.  The proj-
ect was essentially a bio-memetic phototrop inspired by observing a plant 
in my apartment turn with the sun throughout the day.  It was a cylindri-
cal column composed of layers of chambers divided into quadrants each 
supplied with compressed air by hoses running through a central void. 
Two computer-controlled valves pressurized or deflated each quadrant. 
A computer in a chamber below the plaza choreographed its movements. 
It could be ‘played’ like an instrument, or with photo sensors, mimic the 
environmental responsiveness of the plants that inspired it.  Its value as 
a public artwork can certainly be questioned, but it illustrates that I have 
had an abiding interest in responsive machines.
In the previous chapters, I have related how I have affixed a geophone 
to my bedroom wall, how I taught myself electronics in order to make 
machines able to sense the presence of visitors or the environment and 
respond, and I have chronicled the shift from a focus on hardware to a 
concern with experience and through each of these shifts, the interest in 
sensing and responsiveness remains—a reciprocity with the environment 
or context. 
It is this interest in sensing and responding that adds to my fascination 
with the vibrating plates.  Their behavior suggests to me that is a coupling 
between the plate and its environment: that the plate’s activity affects 
aspects of its environment, perhaps many aspects that react in many dif-
ferent ways, and in turn feedback into the behavior of the plate.  I would 
not claim that the plate senses and responds in anything more than an 
analogous way to what organisms do, but the openness and responsive 
that they exhibit indicate that these relational properties, which hold my 
interest, are properties of physical material systems.  These systems are 
not inert hermetic objects but are coupled to their environments and his-
tories in complex webs of interaction.  They are open to influence.
An Open System
There are several and varied advantages of using things found; economic, 
technical, and inspirational.  But these uses differ in type and range from 
the strategy of the objet trouvé that I also use on occasion.  In my prac-
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of the PhD.  Subject matter while still obviously an important aspect of 
the enterprise has increasingly become a vehicle for another kind of dis-
cussion with the student, both in the studio environment and in seminars. 
I make explicit, both in specific exercises, and the larger pedagogical 
objectives, why I’m crafting this particular exercise and how the doing 
of it fits into their larger educational experience.  I explain that what we 
are designing together in the course of three or five years is a designer 
and that individual studio and classes are sacrificial to this goal.  In ad-
dition, they must be capable of driving this process forward both in their 
internships and in practice.  In order to develop their design skills in and 
through the activity of designing the designer, in studios I require a reflec-
tion or self-evaluation of the approach that they took to an exercise and 
how that approach circumscribed and facilitated the final result.  They are 
asked to compare their approach to that of their colleagues and, to the 
extent possible to see a ‘landscape’ of possible approaches and results in 
relation to a problem.  They are also asked how this exercise had helped 
them to uncover things that they need to change and approaches to try in 
the next project.  Sometimes these evaluations are written, but they are 
often conversational.  The conversational ones the students have desig-
nated ‘confessions’.7 
In seminars, I make explicit my philosophical predispositions from the 
outset often explaining why I favor this approach in relation to design.  In 
my introduction to the most recent Sensory Culture seminar, I used many 
of the same themes and sources found in this eisegesis.  I expect this is 
as it should be.  This seminar introduction makes a case for an attitude of 
openness to possibilities, although until now, I could not have character-
ized it as such.  
In reviewing the material that I have covered thus far in this eisegesis, I 
would characterize a significant portion of it as descriptive.  I recognized 
that the description that I made is very much dependent upon the per-
spective from which I viewed it as set forth in the first chapter.  As one 
might expect from someone interested in perception, the visual meta-
phors above are intended to elicit some sense of detachment and ob-
jectification that the third-person perspective often yields.  The shifts of 
attention from object to experience and from pragmatic to epistemic are 
new categorizations I have developed out of and for this work, but they 
describe things that have occurred.  They are processes and will continue 
as long as I do. But as events, they are over.
The discussion about surprises feels different.  I experience these events 
much more in the first-person.  It is not surprising to me that of those 
things that I have discussed; it is this that I now actively foster in my prac-
tice.  In addition, I have just recognized that I place value on openness 
and these things are clearly related.  Moments of surprise are moments of 
openness to new possibility when the old framework is challenged and 
the new framework, if one can be considered, must be designed.
I began the first chapter with Beer’s observations about the relationships 
of frameworks to results, and within my practice, of the role of the un-
expected in challenging the frameworks I hold.  The task of design is to 
address certain conditions and to produce for those conditions, some-
thing new.  As a designer and as a teacher, I’m interested in the way that 
these realizations might be able to be made productive in the making of 
something that is new.  Can my understanding of the interrelationships 
between my cultural and conceptual framing of a situation be productive 
in a design context?
Chapter Five
7	 	This	has	led	me	to	consider	introducing	some	color	into	the	wardrobe.	
others, at times.  It does not make sense to ask which is best, but which 
is good for what.  In the end, each discipline produced projects that were 
of value.
I participated in the national ACSA conference panel, ‘Leading the Cur-
riculum4’, with Wendy Newstetter5, who works in developing curricula 
for biomedical engineering. She noted that a hybrid discipline, made up 
out of medicine, engineering, and biology, requires its student to move 
between constituent epistemologies.  She described medicine as a way 
of seeing the world composed of diagnostics and treatments, biology as 
one interested in infinite complexity, and engineering one in which the 
world is simplified into a model and then ‘you solve the model’.  Each 
epistemology partitions the world differently, understands how it operates 
differently, and uses characteristic actions to make changes in it.  Students 
in Biomedical Engineering must understand which disciplinary lens is be-
ing used at any time and how that affects the visibility of the options avail-
able to them.  She notes that facility with each, and the ability to move 
between them is often the key to developing to a solution successfully.
My inserting the use of multiple disciplines within a discussion of ‘found 
objects’ should not be understood as an effort to objectify disciplines, as 
this would move counter to the process model in which this reflection has 
been undertaken.  Rather, I believe that there is a similar dynamic that 
underlies both; one operating in the field of objects and the other operat-
ing within a cognitive domain.  So to recall Kirsh, one is principally prag-
matic and the other epistemic.  But in both cases, there is openness and 
responsiveness to influences from a larger environment, be that physical 
or philosophical. 
One of the new understandings that I have come to in considering the 
continuities that I recognize within my work is that the strategy of open-
ness and responsiveness to influences has been constant.  It is this that 
underlies my reaction to the repeated occurrence of surprise.  At these 
moments, my understanding is opened to multiple possibilities. I can ask 
myself, “What am I to make of all this? “, and I have choice. Because my 
assumptions about the activity of a physical system were challenged, I am 
not compelled to reformulate my understanding of the physics involved, 
although others in the same situation may be motivated to do just that.  I 
can choose instead to consider what that and the other challenges that 
followed suggest about the nature of the patterns from which I construct 
my world.  One approach seems to be to be focused and specific and the 
other to be more open and expansive.  My choice in the matter, to go with 
the latter, is a personal and characteristic one.  This same predisposition 
underlies my decision to try to foster the condition from which surprises 
occur.  I believe that my preference for these moments of unexpectedness 
is related to the way in which they open possibilities, rather than having 
a situation that is determined, fixed, and predictable.
In addition, having considered this while teaching the Seminar on Senso-
ry Culture, I also recognize now that this attitude is deeply embedded in 
the way in which material for the course has been accumulated, selected 
and organized.  I have included the Syllabus, bibliography and course 
schedule in the appendix.6 But more importantly, this attitude is funda-
mental to the way that I teach.  It is not only embedded in the content and 
methods, but made explicit. 
There has been a considerable shift in the way that I teach over the course 
4	 	2007	95th	Annual	Meeting	of	the	American	Collegiate	Schools	of	Architecture	
Philadelphia,	PA	
5	 	Newstetter	(2006)
6	 	Seminar	on	Sensory	Culture:	Appendix	J
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accepted wisdom into irony. 
I was pleased that at one point in this paper, objectivity fails and Guari-
nero notes how striking it was for him to ‘see himself’ for the first time. 
More properly, he recognizes the correlation between his hand move-
ment and the new experiences he derives from the device. He recognizes 
his agency within the pattern and considers it one of the most important 
moments of his experiences within the experiment. This may have been 
a fundamental shift in his experience from “This is me” to “That is me” 
—from viewing himself in the first person to viewing himself in the third 
person. Do you remember when that happened to you? Neither do I. But, 
it seems a critical moment in consciousness. The ability to shift perspec-
tive at will is an intellectual nimbleness that we think little about, but it is 
fundamental to design activity. I wish he had said more about it. 
It took until 1938 to understand the navigation methods of bats. Appar-
ently, the big ears weren’t enough of a clue. This is despite the fact that in 
1794 Jurine’s experiments at Geneva, confirmed by Spallanzani at Pavia, 
showed the obstacle avoidance behavior of a bat required the use of its 
ears10. Griffin, the first to measure the ultrasonic frequencies used in the 
echolocation of bats, details this history and the reaction of the scientific 
community to the evidence pointing to echolocation noting that all the 
requisite scientific knowledge to solve this puzzle was in place by 1800. 
11 But, “the very idea that bats could use their ears to detect stationary 
objects seemed utterly preposterous, and it was rejected by almost all 
zoologists for over a century”.12 Griffin observes that, in the collision of 
experimental results with common sense and human experience, the ex-
perimental evidence is rejected and, as an example, cites the reaction of 
one ‘zootomical philosopher’ who in 1809 asks sarcastically, “Since bats 
see with their ears, do they hear with their eyes?13
Three things are difficult here; the first is understanding that there exist 
sounds that cannot be heard by humans, the second derives from the 
experience that hearing is passive in the sense that it is used to detect 
sounds emanating from objects—the active send-and-receive cycle used 
in echo-location is not yet realized, and, the third is to understand that 
sound could be used for the fine spatial resolution of the sort that we as-
sociate with vision. 
In the 19th and early 20th centuries, the most commonly accepted expla-
nation for bats’ abilities was that they felt the reflection of their wing-beats 
from objects in their environment. This erroneous assumption informed 
the conceptualization of sonar as published in 1912 by Maxim. 14 While 
he does not produce a sonar device himself, others patent similar con-
cepts within a year. 15 Maxim’s article contains two conceptual shifts. 
First, it turns the popular notion that passively produced or residual sound 
created by bat wings is reflected in a way that is useful to the bat into an 
active system that produces sounds for the purpose of object detection. 
And, he is the first to suggest that sounds that cannot be heard by humans 
could be valuable to bat’s navigation16. By 1920, Hartridge suggested that 
higher frequencies could be used and would provide advantages in ob-
ject detection in virtue of the fact that shorter wavelengths could resolve 
smaller objects17. The confirmation and demonstration of the navigational 
system used by bats finally occurs after fellow undergraduate students at 
10		Griffin	(1958)	p.	61
11		Griffin	(1958)	p.	62
12		Griffin	(1958)	p.	63
13		Griffin	(1958)	p.	63
14		Griffin	(1958)	p.65
15		Snood	(2005)	p.5
16		Griffin	(1958)	p65
17		Griffin	(1958)	p.66
I Don’t Know: volitional amnesia 
In design, it’s not what you know that’s important, it’s what you’ve un-
known.
I am always amused when the explanation given for a particular natural 
trait is that it occurs in order to do something. The giraffe develops a long 
neck in order to reach leaves that are farther from the ground. Or, an or-
chid looks and smells like a female wasp, in order to attract a male wasp 
and harness his activity to reproduce the orchid. This is absurd. There 
are no problems in nature, no solutions and no desires. There is only an 
unfolding of experience. What we understand to be problems are specific 
relationships that occur wholly within the bounds of human cognitive 
and cultural frameworks. In this sense, the frameworks ‘cause’ the prob-
lems. The problems cannot occur without them. 
This notion is similar to Virilio’s realization that the accident is inherent 
in and integral to the technology,8 as the wreck is to the train and the 
crash is to the plane. My position in this is not in relation to technology, 
although that is included, but is instead the general case. All frameworks 
have within them the potential for the problematic. 
And so, there is a problem with the problem. Existing patterns and frame-
works provide the templates with which the context, as well as the prob-
lem, is understood. They structure the flow of experiences in which a 
problem is apprehended, and by which a problem is defined, while they 
simultaneously restrict the visibility of opportunities for resolving it. If the 
frameworks did not so restrict our understanding, there would not be a 
problem. A problem is an attribute of the configuration of the conceptual 
framework as it has been constructed.
In 1974, Guarinero, a congenitally blind philosophy student writing a 
dissertation on the relationship between visual and tactile space, had an 
opportunity to use Bach-y-Rita’s sensory substitution device in order, he 
said, to gain some notion of visual space. This was also a great oppor-
tunity to give an account of what it is like to experience a new mode of 
perception as an adult, well educated in the philosophy of perception. I 
went to some length to obtain the paper in this hope. But, the opportunity 
was largely lost. Guarinero describes his task9, “I have endeavored to 
make this paper a report of an experiment as seen from the point of view 
of the subject, and it must necessarily be as objective and impersonal as 
possible.” 
Reading this paper several decades later, one might wonder why a report 
from the point of view of a subject must of necessity be objective and im-
personal. It seems obvious to me that its value would be directly propor-
tional to its degree of subjectivity. It is not so for Guarinero, because he is 
enmeshed in a cultural framework that privileges and requires exactly this 
objectivity. At the time that he wrote, I was studying perception in what 
was then considered one of the top psychology departments in the United 
States. Its approach was aggressively oriented to experimental methods 
and peer-reviewed publication. Its tough-mindedness and scientific rigor 
accounted for much of its reputation. So while I am very disappointed 
with Guarinero’s ‘objective’ approach as I read the paper 35 years later, I 
also understand how he could view the task as he does in the mid-1970s. 
I was educated in the same way. This illustration was chosen because it 
shows that an accepted framework circumscribes how a goal is defined—
how Guarinero sees his problem. He describes the experiment and not 
his experience. In addition, it shows how an alternative framework turns 
8	 	Virilio(1999)
9	 	Guarniero,	G.	(1974)	
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on which the work is implemented22—Moore’s Law23 masquerading as 
mental development. Phil Agre, computer scientist and critic,24 consid-
ers the lack of progress made in research into artificial intelligence in the 
mid-1990s and attributes it to the unarticulated philosophical assump-
tions that have guided work through much of its early development—
a separation between body and soul (or mind), between hardware and 
software. Essentially, Agre identifies the fact that in the intervening de-
cades the field of Artificial Intelligence had moved forward on only one 
of Turing’s proposed paths and had forgotten the second. He is especially 
skeptical about the way in which technical disciplines tend to focus on 
operations and operational definitions at the expense of a more compre-
hensive consideration.
 As a result, formalization becomes a highly organized form of social 
forgetting -- and not only of the semantics of words but of their historicity 
as well. This is why the historical provenance and intellectual develop-
ment of AI’s underlying ideas claim so little interest among the field’s 
practitioners.25
While Agre is very critical of forgetting, I advocate for it. He sees insti-
tutionalized forgetting as a principal factor in the inability of a field to 
solve the problems it sets for itself. I believe that the ability to forget is one 
of the most important techniques available to solving design problems 
and should be cultivated. Agre suggests that the excavation of the tacit 
philosophical foundations of a discipline is the key to its moving forward, 
while I aspire to a volitional amnesia. And yet, we agree. Rather than be-
ing antagonistic, these approaches are complementary and temporally 
distributed.
One property of facility with or mastery of a tool is its disappearance 
or transparency. A high degree of familiarity produces transparency due 
perhaps to the attraction of novelty as much as the properties of familiar-
ity. The focal awareness moves through the tool to the intention.26 In this 
sense, it has become incorporated into and changes the nature of the be-
ing. This aspect of our relations with our medium can be seen in several 
contexts.
The patterns that we create out of our experiences are not reality and they 
do not reflect a reality. They are not representations; they are tools: tools 
that allow us to proceed within the wash of experience. In some sense, 
we wield them in the same ways as physical and digital tools, and they 
have the same habit of disappearing from our consciousness with famil-
iarity and facility. And, like all tools, their presence charges the landscape 
of possibility with its potential, making some actions, perceptions, or cog-
nitions more likely and others less so. ‘To one with a hammer, everything 
looks like a nail’, noted the psychologist Abraham Maslow.27 Tools both 
enable and constrain. When enabling, the tool remains transparent, but 
the domain of facility is bounded by constraint. When constraining, the 
tool’s potential for visibility returns.
When Agre spoke about institutionalized forgetting it was in reference 
to conceptual frameworks, tools and patterns and was from within the 
domain where the tool or the framework enables. But, the constraints 
imposed by these eventually set limits on what can be achieved. At these 
22		Brooks	(1991)	
23		Moore’s	Law,	named	for	 Intel	 founder,	Gordon	Moore,	 is	 that	 the	number	of	
transistors	that	can	be	placed	on	a	chip	doubles	every	two	years.	
24		Agre	(1995)
25		Agre	(1995)
26		Polanyi	(1958)
27		attributed	to:	Maslow	(1966).	The Psychology of Science.	p.	15	and	also	others	
at	http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_the_instrument
Harvard suggest that Griffin meet with George Washington Peirce who 
had recently invented the ‘supersonic’ (ultrasonic) microphone18.
These small-scale incremental shifts seem a slow and painful inching for-
ward to a point from which a more ‘dramatic discovery’ is made. It takes 
more than a century (and most of it seems to cascade at the end). This is 
not a process that takes place within an individual, but may instead be 
a wider cultural phenomenon that forms the basis for the simultaneous 
invention of things such as light bulbs and calculus. I have recounted this 
history because it indicates that this process is not an easy matter—except 
in retrospect. But in retrospect, I can also contemplate which of these 
changes represents the most difficult conceptual shift. As Robert Irwin 
notes, it is “very precarious for a culture only to be able to measure per-
formance and never be able to credit the questions themselves”.19 What 
appears to be the point of resolution of a problem may well be simply 
the logical result of the conceptual leaps, the questioning of assumptions, 
and the consequent re-understandings that were undertaken previously. 
The reorganization of scientific knowledge proceeds, according to Kuhn, 
by the gradual accumulation of misfits and anomalies that are then ac-
counted for by proposing a new paradigm.20 But in this case, one can al-
most feel the build up of pressure from within the logic of a problem that 
is triggered and released by something as simple as the chance meeting, 
in a zoology lab, of a brown bat and an oscilloscope.
As a designer, I would like a better-than-even-chance rate of innovation. 
Can techniques be developed that directly address a questioning of the 
assumptions that underlying the definition of problems and restrict the 
possibility of their solution? Can the processes that occur at a social scale, 
distributed over time, such as those that have just been reviewed, be com-
pressed and operate at the scale of an individual? Because I believe that 
the ‘problem’ is a product of its frameworks, it is of fundamental impor-
tance to be able to put aside preconception, but how can one come to 
know the generative relationship between these preconceptions and the 
problem at hand?
Anamnesis and Amnesia: first remember and then forget
In what may be the founding paper in artificial intelligence21 Alan Turing 
notes,
“We may hope that machines will eventually compete with men in 
all purely intellectual fields. But which are the best ones to start with? 
Even this is a difficult decision. Many people think that a very ab-
stract activity, like the playing of chess, would be best. It can also be 
maintained that it is best to provide the machine with the best sense 
organs that money can buy, and then teach it to understand and speak 
English. (…) Again I do not know what the right answer is, but I think 
both approaches should be tried.”
Two approaches to an artificial intelligence are proposed, but initially 
only one is pursued. The early decades of research into AI are dominated 
by symbolic and linguistic approaches. Indeed, the chess-playing com-
puter suggested by Turing becomes, in the popular imagination—aided by 
an uncritical press and propagandizing researchers—both example and 
proof of advances in the field. But much of what are claimed as advances 
can be attributed instead to improvements in the computational hardware 
18		Gross	(2003)
19		Weschler,	L.	(1982)	p.	86
20		Kuhn	(1962)	p.x
21		Turing	(1950)
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this approach. This group is convenient, rather than comprehensive, but 
will serve to contextualize these thoughts within a range of cultural prac-
tices. Although they do not explicitly speak of either forgetfulness or un-
knowing, they are practices that attempt to do exactly that for the purpose 
of opening up possibilities that are restricted by the accepted frameworks 
and tacit assumptions that form the basis on which both problems and 
solutions are defined.
The inability to ‘close’ our ears, results in a highly developed ability to 
focus attention on some sound sources and ignore others. We have devel-
oped cultural traditions that designate certain things as content and com-
munication and others as interference. Some things are signal and oth-
ers noise. Murray Schafer’s ecological approach to soundscapes relies on 
the ability to notice, evaluate and appreciate sound from all sources. His 
book, Ear Cleaning, Notes on an Experimental Music Course,31 is a primer 
of exercises intended to strip away conditioned biases that direct percep-
tion away from sounds in the environment in order to focus on ‘content’. 
Schafer recalls that in one exercise in which he asks participants to note 
the sounds that they hear, older children and adults typically do not ac-
knowledge that their own bodies make a considerable amount of sound. 
They may not record that they hear the sound of their own voice, for ex-
ample, or their breathing or heartbeat, while younger children often do.32 
Adults may not acknowledge the sounds made by their recording of the 
things that they hear.
This editing is learned, and must be unlearned if the full range of sound 
available to the human ear can be made available to the hearer. An im-
portant part of ear cleaning is unlearning the automatic filtering that we 
impose on sound and bring this facility to bear actively, from time to time, 
on the incidental sounds of the environment. The goal of this re-education 
is to appreciate sounds that we are suppressing or ignoring, but as impor-
tantly to become aware of and actively manage those sounds that should 
not be in the environment.
From 1996 to 1999, I was the Fay Jones Visiting Professor at the University 
of Arkansas. The school has two visiting professorships. At that time, the 
John Williams Visiting Professor, the other and more senior position, was 
held by Peter Eisenman. I had the opportunity to observe, and in a pe-
ripheral way participate in, some of the discussion concerning the studios 
that he offered. 
The approach in these projects was to develop a parti in a relatively nor-
mal way. Then, following an analysis of some dynamic phenomena re-
lated to the context of the project, extract those dynamics, model them 
computationally, and apply them to the parti. The resulting sequence of 
increasingly transformed diagrams was ‘read’ for its spatial and architec-
tural potential. When the selection of a compelling transform had been 
made, the project was to be developed as an architectural design in a 
more conventional manner. By that point, much of what the student had 
absorbed of architectural culture through education and experience was 
simply inapplicable. Because of this, the projects were free to develop in 
a new way, but this new direction was no longer clear. However, from the 
discussion of a score of student projects, a way or ways forward might be 
found. Thus, the teaching became a laboratory for the investigation of this 
technique. 
But, the studio was not focused on the technique or the result, but on the 
critic. Much of the discussion surrounding these studios was centered 
on ‘the computer’ and software, on the visibility of the software in the 
31		Schafer	(1967)	
32		Schafer	(1967)	p.	8
limits, the tool regains its visibility. Agre observes, “…technical impasses 
are a form of social remembering, moments when a particular discur-
sive form deconstructs itself and makes its internal tensions intelligible 
to anyone who is critically equipped to hear them.”28 In this case, it is 
particularly important to be aware of constraints that are imposed by the 
frameworks we use to organize our world, as they may be particularly 
enlightening about our ability to realize the options that are available for 
the solution of problems that arise from within these frameworks.
Once this social remembering has occurred, it is time to forget again, but 
now in a different and directed way. So two types of forgetting are posited. 
This first is passive, a disappearance driven by familiarity. The second is 
active and results from a suspicion or recognition of the limits imposed by 
the conceptual framework. The first kind of forgetting results from trans-
parency; the second from visibility. The second forgetting is willful, volun-
tary, directed and purposeful. That is, Agre is concerned with instances in 
which one forgets that there is a framework, whereas volitional amnesia 
directs forgetting to the framework itself. 
Another description for this activity might be ‘unknowing’. In this context, 
it would be less in reference to the standard definitions that suggest igno-
rance, and more akin to undoing, of reversing something that had been 
done. This is as used in ‘to button’ and then to ‘unbutton’, here, to have 
known and to undo that knowing. Unknowing used as a verb. Rather 
than the ‘willing suspension of disbelief’ that is oft-cited as a require-
ment of successful fiction, what is needed here is a ‘willing suspension of 
belief’; the ability and desire to set aside the assumed, tacit and the pre-
conceived, but also perhaps the explicitly favored.
One approach to problems is to probe the understandings that are brought 
to them—that define them—in an effort to create a new configuration of 
patterns that resolves the issue or that restructures it into something that 
can be handled. Susan Oyama, a developmental systems theorist, criti-
cizes of the information-processing model of biological development that 
recognizes a tacit opposition between that which determines variety, the 
variables, and what determines continuity, the constraints. This is an ac-
tive vs. passive characterization. She notes, instead, that one way of un-
derstanding a constraint is that it is a variable that isn’t varying.29 She also 
notes that constraints are as interdependent as variables are and that what 
constitutes an effective constraint depends as much on the properties of 
the rest of the system as does an effective stimulus.30
There may be some value in thinking about the constellation of patterns 
that we bring to a problem as analogous to developmental systems and 
to view intellectual, philosophical, conceptual and cultural frameworks 
as an interdependent system of patterns in which a certain constraint is 
a property of a particular configuration. The advantage of understanding 
constraint in this way in relation to intellectual frameworks is that it leaves 
open the possibility that things could be different, whereas constraint, as 
typically understood, is something fixed and unalterable. It also suggests 
that constraints may not be altered only by changing the constraint itself 
but by other shifts in its context, and therefore may or may not be appro-
priately affected by alternations within its immediate context.
Knowing is Doing: Seeing is Forgetting
As a strategy, therapeutic agnosia is not unique. In the following, I give 
several examples, drawn from texts, experiences and practices that have 
been encountered in the course of my work and that serve to corroborate 
28		Agre	(1995)
29		Oyama	(1985)	p69
30		Oyama	(1985)	p.X
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the environment, does not lead to an understanding of the socio-cultural 
dimensions of music in other countries (and why would it?). In Eisen-
man’s design studio, material properties, structural capacities and envi-
ronmental performance were not theorized within the process and so 
could not be expected within the output. Given Irwin’s technique, it is 
not surprising that what he comes to is phenomenal in character—this is 
what remains available. Yet within each of these circumscribed domains 
of possibility lies infinite variety.
While unknowing can be considered a technique for opening up pos-
sibilities, this openness is defined relative to the ‘visibility of the solution 
space’38 from within the prior frameworks. The relationship between the 
practices examined and the results obtained, suggests that the selection of 
what to unlearn is not a neutral opening into a vast space of possibilities 
but a directed illumination of potential. How does one come to under-
stand what to shift? For these practitioners, the unknowing is targeted at 
explicit discontents borne out of a critical evaluation of current practices. 
Although one cannot know what specific possibilities the selective ques-
tioning of assumptions will open, this is clearly not random groping into 
the void. Irwin’s thoughts as he stares at the canvas are not recorded and 
so, we are not informed as to how an artist’s characteristic engagement 
with the work becomes the technique of productive boredom. Was that 
an explicit decision, and if so how and when was it made? And, why 
this among the range of possible actions? In any case, at some point or 
through some transition, Irwin’s looking critically at his own work took on 
a new function, a therapeutic amnesia.
Seeing is forgetting the name exactly captures the spirit of what I call un-
knowing, although it is more limited if taken literally. It is related to the 
non-fungability of experience into language. Translation into the code of 
language results in a diffuseness proportional to the degree of generality 
of the terms used. Sometimes there is a loss in translation and the words 
fail to capture the fullness of the phenomenon. But, sometimes there is 
also a gain and the words suggest far more than that which is pointed 
to. Agre notes this.39 This slippage, either less or more than, is generally 
overlooked. Language comes to structure our experience and we begin 
to experience in the terms that language provides. Eidetic memory is an 
ability to recall in great deal something that has been seen. It is believed 
to be related to the ability to hold an image so vividly in memory as to be 
able to ‘look’ at it again and to pull from it additional detail that may not 
have been noticed initially. This ability is rare in adults, but more com-
mon in young children—for many of them, it is an ability that fades with 
the acquisition of language 40. This suggests that there may be an intimate 
and, to some extent, oppositional relationship between perception and 
language. To come back to experience, we must resist language in order 
to transcend it. 
Language is but one of the frameworks that we use to organize experi-
ence. My conceptual frameworks, philosophical foundations, personal 
and cultural histories disciplinary epistemologies, even the body I inhabit, 
all patterns that I create, circumscribe my experiences and expectations. 
But, there must be slippage between the pattern and the experiences to 
come, because patterns have no predictive power, although I may wish 
that were true. I often find a continued correlation with those experiences 
from the past that formed the basis for the pattern. Then again, sometimes 
not and I am surprised. These moments are critical. Kuhn suggests two 
alternative paths can be used to deal with surprises. One in which the 
experience is explained into compliance with the framework held, and 
38		Krueger	(2000)	Appendix	B
39		Agre	(1995)
40		Rivlin	and	Gravelle	(1984)	p.	X
solution, and how to select a solution from an infinite sequence—the 
‘stopping problem’. This, the studios shared with many others being un-
dertaken at the same time. However, Eisenman’s studios were not ‘about 
the computer’; they were efforts to forget.
Eisenman has a profound knowledge of the western architectural canon 
from a perspective that was significantly shaped by Colin Rowe. This way 
of understanding architecture was so ingrained that it became inescap-
able. He was no longer capable of thinking outside of it. Eisenman real-
ized this imprisonment and saw within these emerging computational 
processes a method by which the relational topologies and spatial logic 
embedded in a parti could be retained while the specific spatial configu-
ration and the tectonic logic that is inherent in the architecture of the 
western tradition could be opened up. He needed to get out of his own 
way.
In the transom above the door to Greene 20633 are the words: “ Seeing 
is forgetting the name of the thing one sees”, a quote attributed to Paul 
Valéry and the title of a book about Robert Irwin, a biography giving an 
account of Irwin’s transformation as an artist.34 Perhaps the most signifi-
cant event in his early career is his hanging of an exhibition that marked 
his ‘arrival’ as a young painter of note. When viewing the work as a col-
lection, he came to understand it as facile and vacuous. This launched 
him into a search that lasted for many years35 and resulted in an original 
contribution to American art of the 20th century. As part of the search for 
a new direction, he harnessed two tools—time and attention. In this, he is 
not unique. One might be given that advice in any situation where there 
is the aspiration to mastery. But, Irwin wielded these tools in an anoma-
lous way. In one particularly intense, and for me fascinating, exercise he 
spent an extended time in his studio in the concentrated and profound 
observation of monochromatic canvases. This period was characterized 
by sessions of acute looking that might last half-an-hour followed by his 
falling asleep for a similar amount of time. Upon waking, the cycle began 
again, and again for weeks.36 
He describes the strategy, 
Boredom is a very good tool. Because when you play creative games, 
what you normally do is you bring to the situation all your aspirations, 
all your assumptions, all your ambitions — all your stuff. And then you 
pile it up on your painting, reading into the painting all the things you 
want it to be. (…) Boredom is a great way to break that. You do the 
same thing over and over and over again, until you’re bored stiff with 
it. Then all your illusions, aspirations, everything just drains off. And 
now what you see is what you get.37
Irwin invents a practice that results in the erasure of aspiration, assump-
tion and ambition. He is forgetting, to the extent possible, the tacitly ac-
cepted pre-determinants of his art, in order to come to something essen-
tial.
One aspect of these practices that bears explicit mention is that in each 
the particular nature of the practice of unknowing circumscribes quite 
closely the kinds of results that are obtained. For example, ‘ear cleaning’ 
while opening up the perception and perhaps appreciation of sound in 
33		At	Rensselaer’s	School	of	Architecture	is	housed	in	the	Greene	Building.	Rom	
206	was	a	drawing	studio	developed	by	Michael	Oatman	who	had	the	inscription	
placed	above	the	door.
34		Weschler	(1982)
35		Weschler	(1982)	p.x
36	Weschler	(1982)	p.x	
37		Weschler	(1982)	p.x
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For now, I will say that decisions about what to unknow are arrived at 
‘intuitively’ and lay that down as an explanatory principle. When Bateson 
puts forth the notion of the explanatory principle in the Metalogues,45 he 
illuminates certain words that appear to explain something but operate 
instead as tacit agreements about the boundary of knowledge. But, assert-
ing that something is an explanatory principle from the outset is to mark it 
instead as being exactly not an explanation, but rather a point at which I 
stop the examination in this context with intent to return and as an invita-
tion for others should they have the interest.
45		Bateson	(1972)	p.	1-8
another in which it becomes the basis for the adoption of an alternative,41 
perhaps new, framework. It may seem as though unknowing as proposed 
here would have to do primarily with the second. But, there is also an-
other way. 
Misfits, anomalies, and surprises can be understood as markers outlin-
ing the applicability of the framework. Instead of pointing exclusively to 
the new, they are also capable of delimiting the existing framework. In 
addition, as Agre noted, problems, especially those that do not yield to 
repeated attempts at solution, may point to inherent limitations in the un-
derlying conceptual frameworks. As problems outline, define, or circum-
scribe the domain of applicability of a framework, they give it a ‘shape’. 
Kuhn’s focus on confirmation and rejection rests on an assumption that 
there is an external reference standard to be matched. The more interest-
ing questions for me concern the conditions under which a framework 
yields suitable results and those under which it is inapplicable. What one 
misses within Kuhn’s paradigm, is any ability to develop either taxonomy 
or intuition about the shape and structure of frameworks, or to develop 
any general notions about their use. Oyama provides an excellent exam-
ple of how this kind of understanding might be applied to contemporary 
problems.
I often assign a chapter of Oyama’s Ontogeny of Information to my stu-
dents. The Ghosts in the Ghosts in the Machine Machine42 is valuable as 
an example of an argument critical not only of factual content and the 
philosophical frameworks used to determine and structure these facts, but 
of the similar oppositional structure that can be found across many theo-
ries of development. As a leading proponent of Developmental Systems 
Theory, Oyama is critical of descriptions that parcel responsibility for an 
organism’s development to either genetics or environment or even to 
some combination of them. She ties an extremely wide range of theories 
together by showing a fundamental similarity within their assumptions 
about the nature of causality. Tied together in this way, a disparate group 
of theoretical positions can be seen not only to share this common struc-
ture, but thereby to share similar problems when matters of explanation 
confront them. Oyama is able to show that approaches that make use of 
this oppositional structure encounter similar impasses in accounting for 
the developmental sequence of organisms. In this case, a common shape 
or structure of the framework, rather than its explicit details, circum-
scribes its utility. Having understood this, it is possible to examine similar 
structures in other domains in this light and perhaps to find equivalent 
opportunities for a new understanding.
Underlying many analyses of frameworks is the assumption of some kind 
of drive towards unification or consistency. Anomalies, difficulties, and 
surprises are either suppressed or become the basis for a revision of the 
framework. This may be true for scientists and philosophers. It may be 
less true for others where substantial inconsistencies may peacefully co-
exist. And, unification and consistency might not be helpful to designers. 
The ability to reconsider ones assumptions about a problem is central to 
creativity. Perhaps designers should be taught techniques of active man-
agement of their frameworks as a way to open thinking. As von Foerster 
observes, it is only on issues of un-decidability that we can decide.43 
Glanville adds that one can decisively suspend decision in order to main-
tain an awareness of choice44. Perhaps I can, as well, actively manage my 
frameworks when this facilitates design. 
41		Kuhn	(1962)
42		Oyama	(1985)	p.	84-128
43		von	Foerster	(2003)
44		Glanville	(2006)
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significant work; instead it was always in the way, pretending to be the 
causal engine when, in fact, it gave no illumination whatsoever. I pre-
sented the paper There is No Intelligence3 at the International Society for 
Electronic Arts conference in Sao Paulo in 1999. Following my session, 
Ranulph Glanville patiently explained that I had discovered for myself the 
explanatory principle as described by Bateson in the Metalogues4.
My interest in perception and cognition followed these studies of intel-
ligence. Eventually, I was to come to a similar point in my understanding 
of how we perceive. The paper Nonsense5 results from the inability of 
a modal decomposition of perception to guide the development of the 
perceptual prosthetics that was my interest at that time. It questions what 
has been a dominant way of understanding the senses for many centuries6 
that had formed the basis for my native understanding of perception. 
These two papers are not only related to the third, the chapter here called 
I Don’t Know, but are instances of it.7 They develop at the point at which I 
decide to remove some element that had been a part of my thinking either 
because of a lack of faith in its efficacy, or because the removal allows 
me to see anew the things that hold my interest. This is what leads me to 
expect that I have found a characteristic way of operating of which I was 
not aware. Like the discovery of ‘openness’ as a trait that came out of the 
consideration of continuities in my practice over time, this way of operat-
ing is fundamental, perhaps close to being a personality trait, a recurring 
way of relating to what I understand to be commonly held frameworks. 
In retrospect, this setting aside of my previous understanding is what 
drove the rejection of the post-modern formalism in which I was edu-
cated and my decision to concentrate on behavior rather than form in, 
for example, the Katonah Museum installation. It may also have to do 
with my predisposition to read widely and often in literatures that do not 
coincide with those of the architectural community of which I am apart. 
In seeing this as a pattern that extends backward in time, I am aware 
that I am organizing some of the same dispositions as I did when I wrote 
about openness. They may be related in some way. The general attitude 
of openness may be served by this way of operating; an effort to put aside 
the fixed, reliable, comfortable or continuous in order to make room for 
something that might remain hidden behind it.
Having moved through a trajectory towards work increasingly in the epis-
temic realm, I have also recently been attracted to a reconsideration of the 
role of objects in my practice although it is as yet unclear what form this 
should take. The foundation of this reconsideration can be found within 
my current work. It grows out of the notion of the prosthetic that was 
important in the design of perceptual devices, but is also evident in the 
description of frameworks as tools. It can be seen in the way in which I 
employ objects or forms to open up questions about peri-personal space. 
I have been accumulating materials for a new seminar with a working title 
of ‘Tool Theory’ that will develop a disciplined understanding of tools as 
epistemic or cognitive technologies for designers. The role of the object 
in design is for many central to the practice. While I started my practice 
in this way, I have moved to an epistemic focus. If I return to the world 
of objects, it will be with a new and very different understanding than I 
3	 	Krueger	(2000)	Appendix	C
4	 	Bateson	(1972)	pp.	1-8
5	 	Krueger	(2006)	Appendix	G
6	 	I	am	not	claiming	that	I	am	the	first	to	think	this	way,	only	that	this	paper	sets	
forth	how	I	think	about	it.	Other	similar	thoughts	by	others	are	cited	in	the	paper.
7	 	Reading	the	titles	of	 the	papers	may	lead	one	to	believe	that	This is Not En-
tertainment may	be	part	of	 the	series.	 Its	name	 is	 taken	 from	a	 title	of	a	poster	
referring	to	the	Dream	House	and	is	therefore	not	derived	from	the	same	kind	of	
reflection	that	drives	these	three.
Inconclusion
If I accept the notion that I construct the world that I inhabit, then I must 
take responsibility for the creation of the patterns that I hold1. Thereby, I 
also gain a measure of control over them and freedom to work with them. 
They are tools, my tools, and I wield them, redesign them, pass them 
along to others, wear them out, or put them down when they no longer 
serve. The last chapter set forth one example of doing this, the active un-
covering and suspension of assumption.
These thoughts do not follow from the activities of my practice in the same 
way as did my seeing a shift in the subject matter or the objectives of the 
work. Noting these transformations resulted from the process of reflecting 
on the work. Coming to understand the role of surprise was especially 
important. But the unexpected has for me two experiential components, 
one delighting, one chastising. What I reference as delight is the opening 
up of potential that occurs when the unexpected happens. My current un-
derstanding has been challenged and the future becomes underspecified. 
Things are about to get interesting. As I learned with the vibrating plate 
experiments; one surprise is frequently followed by another. What I mean 
by chastising is the realization that my understandings are prone to failure 
because most often I take them to be real rather than ‘as if’.2
Consideration of the delight of surprise lead me to shift again the objec-
tive of my practice to one that designs the conditions which give rise to 
the surprise. Repeated encounters with the unexpected also led me to 
wonder why my frameworks were so frequently inadequate to the task at 
hand. It was the repeated chastising of surprise that suggested that I take 
more active control of the frameworks that I use. If things often get inter-
esting when my preconceived notions fail, then perhaps I can manipulate 
my predispositions in order to induce the interesting. So both of these 
more recent shifts in my practice have resulted from a metareflection. 
Here the goal is less to describe what the practices are and more to sug-
gest what they might be in light of what I have learned.
Much of what has been written here has as its premise the construction 
of my world by means of the patterns I create out of my experiences. Part 
of the historical trajectory of constructivism may be its need to constantly 
argue against the realist majority that a cohesive reality can be created 
out of the flow of experience. Perhaps, this results in a focus on cohe-
sion and integration and what seemed to me to be their necessity, almost 
inevitability. Having adopted that perspective and used it to structure this 
reflection on my practice, I found myself in the end thinking about the 
potential offered by the willful forgetting of pattern on the one hand and 
on the other, developing a process that deliberately seeks exception to 
what I know. 
Because I worked through the idea of volitional amnesia in the process 
of writing that chapter, I am now able to see yet another heretofore hid-
den continuity in my work. There is something that feels familiar in the 
thinking through and setting out of these thoughts about unknowing. It 
has to do with a shift in my relationship with a body of knowledge with 
which I have had some significant contact but which no longer resolves 
the questions put to it. 
After studying intelligence in its natural and artificial forms that I began 
to become uneasy with the concept. I wasn’t sure precisely what intel-
ligence was, and having done a reasonable amount of research, I became 
convinced that no one else knew either. It didn’t seem to be doing any 
1	 	Von	Foerster	(2003)
2	 	Glanville	(1999)
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had initially, and my expectation is that it will yield very different results. 
In addition, I return not only as a designer, but as one whose practice 
involves teaching.
I began this eisegesis with a consideration of how patterns held, in virtue 
of having undertaken the work analyzed, influences the interpretation of 
the work itself. Patterns and their transformation became the organizing 
device for the review of the work. Within this consideration, surprises, the 
exceptions to pattern, become a principal mode of learning in the course 
of the PhD. This thematic was then used retrospectively to reread earlier 
work organizing it into a legible pattern. I could see that the attractiveness 
of surprises was part of a more general attitude of openness to change, 
new experiences, and perspectives that characterizes my way of operat-
ing as a designer.
Amnesiology, the voluntary suppression of pattern, is one of the principle 
realizations that came out of undertaking the PhD. But this, too, was seen 
as a device that could be used to retrospectively organize previous work 
and understand it in a new way and therefore to return this consideration 
back it its origin: 
Patterns held determine patterns seen.
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13.1  Neil Denari PA12 Cover
13.2 Ted Krueger PA14 Cover
13.3 Kaplan & Krueger PA14
15.1 David Heinlein Columbia Installation
15.2 David Heinlein GigaBips detail
15.3 Ken Kaplan Art Park detail
16.1 David Heinlein Columbia detail
16.2 David Heinlein GigaBips detail
16.3 Ken Kaplan Art Park computer and antennae
17.1 Simon Penny  Katonah Museum Installation view
20.1 Ted Krueger MAXM front quarter view  
21.1 Bach-y-Rita(1972) Early Sensory Substitution Device
22.1 Ted Krueger ElectroMagnetic Glove  
23.2 Simon Penny Katonah Museum Installation Detail
26.1 Ted Krueger Tetris
28.1 Mason Juday Compass Belt II Detail
28.2 Mason Juday Compass Belt
31.1 Ted Krueger Vibration Studies test bed
31.2 Ted Krueger 7.5-minute amplitude plot
31.1 Ted Krueger Anti-sound detail amplitude plot
34.1 Ted Krueger 9 hr. run amplitude plot partial early
35.1 Ted Krueger 9 hr. run amplitude plot partial later
37.1 Ted Krueger Peri-personal point cloud
38.1 Joseph Choma Peri-personal point clouds
38.2 Joseph Choma Peri-personal photographic studies
38.3 Joseph Choma Peri-personal space, right and left volumes combined
38.4 Joseph Choma Peri-personal space, intersection right & left volumes
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41.3 Ted Krueger ElectroMagnetic Glove circuit board
42.1 Ted Krueger Light Fixture
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Apendix J
Seminar on Sensory Culture
Syllabus ARCH 6864
Overview:
In the last two decades, there has been a growing realization that the 
cognitivist/computationalist perspective that has dominated our under-
standing of the processes of perception is no longer yielding insights. 
This impasse, according to Agre, and others, is due to the underlying 
philosophical structure of the disciplines involved. The reliance on logic 
and the mind/body dualism of Descartes has given way to a growing lit-
erature on the operation of the body and the senses in cognition. This new 
perspective is revolutionizing our understanding of the relationship of hu-
mans to the environments that they create and inhabit. In addition, we 
have also come to understand that knowing and our construction of real-
ity is vastly more diverse than was allowed under the previous paradigm.
The purpose of the course is to provide the foundation for the disciplined 
study of senses referencing research and perspectives drawn from biology, 
cognitive science, physiology, perceptual psychology, literature, philoso-
phy and the arts. The aim of the seminar is to develop an understanding 
of the relationship between humans and their environments as mediated 
by the human sensorium. In particular, we are working towards an under-
standing that is consistent with and supports design practices. Therefore, 
the knowledge we seek is not driven by description and analysis but by 
the desire to synthesize in the context of practice. 
Objectives:
The seminar will build factual knowledge of contemporary understand-
ings of perception and the senses across a wide range of disciplines. The 
seminar will build critical, analytic, observational, and communication 
skills while also requiring the synthesis of a revised understanding of the 
reciprocity between sensory and perceptual processes and biological, so-
cial and cultural phenomena.  The seminar will focus on the implications 
for design of research findings from diverse fields. 
Student Learning Outcomes
Students will be able to critically evaluate perspectives in a variety of dis-
ciplines and make connections between them as evidenced in the written 
commentaries in response to readings, presentations, installations, and 
performances.
Students will demonstrate the ability to synthesize interdisciplinary un-
derstandings in their discussions of the readings each week.
Students will demonstrate factual knowledge of the course content in 
their in-class presentations.
Students will demonstrate the ability to use their understanding of the 
course materials in design practice by designing presentation to the semi-
nar.
Format:
Papers from a wide range of disciplines will be read and discussed during 
the course of the semester. Despite its listing in the course catalogue, this 
Appendices
Papers referred to in the main text as occuring in Appendices can be 
found in the following publications or locations:
Interactivity and Control in Proceedings of the Sixth Annual International 
Symposium for Electronic Arts - Montreal, 1995
A version of this paper was also published as: 'Infinite State Machines" , 
Architectural Design (London, England) v. 64 (Sept./Oct. '94)
On the Design of Organisms in Consciousness Reframed III, Art and Con-
sciousness in the Post-Biological Era., Proceedings of the Third Interna-
tional Research Conference at the Center for Advanced Inquiry into the 
Interactive Arts at the University of Wales College, Newport, Roy Ascott, 
editor, August 23-26, 2000
There is no Intelligence Paper presented at Invenção 99: Thinking the 
Next Millenium Sao Paulo, Brazil August 25-29, 1999   available at: http://
www.itaucultural.org.br/invencao/download/tedKrueger.zip
Interfaces to Non-symoblic Media available at :dangermouse.brynmawr.
edu/ec/Krueger.ps
Also published in French as: Des Interfaces aux medias non Symboliques, 
in Poissant ed. Des Esthetique Arts Mediatiques. Interfaces et Sensorialite, 
Preses de l’Universite du Quebec. Montreal, Canada 2002
An earlier version of this paper was published as, ‘Eliminate the Inter-
face’, in Blank, ed. Proceedings of the 11th Midwest Artificial Intelligence 
and Cognitive Science Conference, Menlo Park, CA: AIAA Press, 2000
An Architecture of Extreme Environments in Armstrong, R. (ed)Space Ar-
chitecture,  Architectural Design A.D. 2000, Mar
Media Augmented eXercise Machine available at www.rpi.edu/~krueger/
MAXM
Nonsense Technoetic Arts: a journal of speculative research, 4(3), pp. 
183-91 
Devices for the Perception of Magnetic Fields in Enactive / 07, Proceed-
ings of the 4th International Conference on Enactive Interfaces 2007, No-
vember 19 - 24, 2007, Grenoble, France p.133 available at http://acroe.
imag.fr/enactive07/proceedings.php
This is Not Entertainment in Architectural Design A.D. Preston, J. (ed.)
Special Issue: Interior Atmospheres, Volume 78, Issue 3, pages 12–15, 
Appendix A
Appendix B
Appendix C
Appendix D
Appendix E
Appendix F
Appendix G
Appendix H
Appendix I
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is not a lecture course, but a theory seminar. However, its subject matter 
has to do with experience and therefore the sole reliance on reading as 
a means of generating discussion becomes a contradiction. Field trips to 
installations, galleries, performances and restaurants will be required and 
may substitute for readings as the generator of discussion. There will be 
no required textbook for the course, readings will be provided or avail-
able online, however, costs of the field trips will be borne by the student 
in lieu of the costs of the textbooks.
Typically, the reading assignment is to be completed before class and an 
approximately 500 word commentary written about the reading in rela-
tion to the evolving discourse in the seminar and to personal experience. 
This commentary must be a critical evaluation not a restatement of the 
reading. Anticipate that these commentaries may be read to the seminar 
to start the discussion. 
Not all readings will be read by all students, so it is important to be able 
to present the readings that you have been assigned to other members of 
the seminar with accuracy and subtlety.
Teams of students will develop a project presentation to the seminar that 
builds on and addresses issues selected, in consultation with the profes-
sor, from the course content. Requirements for the presentation will be 
distributed. The presentation must take the form of an experience
Academic Integrity
Student-teacher relationships are built on trust. Acts that violate this trust 
undermine the educational process. The Rensselaer Handbook of Student 
Rights and Responsibilities defines the various forms of academic dishon-
esty and you should make yourself familiar with these. In class all written 
assignments that are turned in must represent your own work. Submission 
of any assignment that is in violation of this policy will result in an ‘F’ for 
the assignment. Submission of a second such assignment will result in the 
failure of the course.
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